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” For the second time in seven years, the bursting of a major-asset bubble has inflicted great 
damage on world financial markets. In both cases, the equity bubble in 2000 and the credit 
bubble in 2007, central banks were asleep at the switch. The lack of monetary discipline has 
become a hallmark of unfettered globalization. Central banks have failed to provide a stable 
underpinning to world financial markets and to an increasingly asset-dependent global 
economy.” - Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley 
 
“A bank is a place where they lend you an umbrella in fair weather and ask for it back when it 
begins to rain.” – Robert Frost 
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Summary 
 
My thesis investigates the two most recent crises affecting the Norwegian banking system, 
namely the Norwegian banking crisis from 1988 to 1993 and the recent financial crisis 
reaching Norwegian markets in 2008. Although the financial crisis was a global phenomenon 
and originated from the US mortgage market, my main focus will be on the Norwegian system 
and how it was affected by the spillovers from international markets. Chapters 2 and 3 provide 
a presentation of the two crises and chapter 4 compares them in some key respects. 
Even though every banking crisis has some unique characteristics, there also exist 
several fundamental similarities. Banks, through their organization, are exposed to external 
shocks affecting market risks, the capitalization of firms and consumers, and aggregate 
investment. The main task of a commercial bank is to act as a financial intermediary, 
transforming deposits from customers and funding by outside investors into loans and further 
investments. Profits are generated from earning a higher interest or return on the loans and 
investments than what is demanded by depositors and investors. An unregulated, profit 
maximizing bank will try to expand its activity as much as possible in proportion to its own 
capital.  
Loans are often long-term and considered less liquid than deposits. This maturity-
mismatch between investments and funding is an important source of risk to a bank since the 
premature liquidation of assets is likely to drive down their prices. Falling asset prices can 
cause a bank to become illiquid and eventually insolvent. Being liquid means that the bank at 
all times possesses legal tender to service transactions, like withdrawals, while solvency means 
that the value of the bank’s assets exceeds the value of the bank’s liabilities excluding own 
capital. When a bank is suffering from decreasing asset values due to for example an increasing 
number of defaults on its loans, solvency is upheld by the share of a banks capital that can be 
written down as compensation, for example stocks, but obviously not deposits.  
Prior to both crises, banks kept only small levels of capital relative to their operations. 
Investments were largely funded by relatively cheap short-term debt which can be difficult to 
refinance in a recession. While such a strategy is capable of boosting earnings during periods 
of strong economic growth, it will also increase risk exposure and thus likely contribute to 
larger financial problems during a recession. In other words, a short-term profit maximizing 
strategy will increase the impact of fluctuations in the business-cycle on the banking system 
and the real economy, and can be referred to as pro-cyclical banking.  
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Chapter 5 I introduces a model by Holmström and Tirole from 1997 which shows how moral 
hazard creates a need for intermediaries in the financial system. Banks can monitor investments 
through repeated transactions with their borrowers and can make the arrangement efficient by 
exploiting economies of scale. The monitoring alleviates the moral hazard problem. Individual 
investors are assumed to find monitoring to be too expensive to undertake themselves. Banks 
can therefore profit on financing a market share of firms considered too risky or opaque by 
individual, uninformed investors. Within this framework, the authors illustrate how the volume 
of credit and capital in the system affect investment, financial intermediaries and regular firms. 
Since the model was designed in the time period between the two crises in question and was 
partly inspired by the Norwegian banking crisis, I will test its explanatory powers on recent 
events.   
My thesis will, in the light of the two banking crises, examine how pro-cyclical banking 
affects the availability of credit in the market and how this in turn affects firms dependent on 
debt financing from banks. I will also look at how the business cycle affects banks’ lending 
behavior and their approach to risk. By looking at the two most recent crises to the Norwegian 
banking system, I will point to similarities and differences. Unregulated banks are under 
pressure to offer its investors and shareholders with a competitive rate of return. If the whole 
system gravitates towards maximizing short-term profits at potentially high future risk of 
default, then the banking system is in a bad equilibrium in the sense that longevity and a stable 
credit supply is undermined.  
There has been clear progress in the way Norwegian banks operate since the Norwegian 
banking crisis. Improved regulation and higher capital levels have rendered the banking system 
more robust against external shocks. Still government intervention to restore system liquidity 
was required during the recent crisis. Internationally, there has also been an increased use of 
financial innovation, with the effect of banks moving risky assets off their balance sheets, 
enabling them become highly leveraged despite regulation. I therefore feel that a thesis 
questioning certain fundamental, possibly destabilizing aspects of banking is very relevant in 
light of the recent financial crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
The world economy is recovering from a financial crisis which most notably left the United 
States in the deepest recession since World War II. At the center of events were the failures of 
large banks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, the run on the UK bank Northern Rock, 
and the controversy concerning government rescue packages. The IMF has been monitoring 
the aggregate losses suffered by banks and other financial institutions due to the financial 
crisis. As of April 2009 the reduced value of total holdings had reached a staggering $4 trillion. 
Of that amount, $2.7 trillion were from loans and assets originating from the US alone (IMF, 
2009). World leaders at the G-20 meeting, which took place in London the same year, 
suggested injecting $1.1 trillion into the world’s financial markets to rectify the situation (ibid). 
Even though Norway has fared relatively well compared to other European economies, the 
crisis made apparent several weaknesses in the banking system also relevant for Norwegian 
banks.  
A series of regulatory efforts to strengthen the banking industry against adverse shocks 
have been put forth by the Basel Committee and the EU over the last two decades. Although 
every economic crisis has different traits and origins, there are also several common 
denominators when looking at a more basic level. Banks, through their economic organization, 
are vulnerable to fluctuations in business-cycles. As major suppliers of credit to consumers and 
firms, the failure of banks affects both their depositors and their lenders in addition to 
shareholders and employees. A systemic banking crisis
 
can thus have widespread negative 
effects on the real economy, as the resulting credit crunch prevents clients from getting loans. 
For an explanation of what is meant by a systemic banking crisis, as well as other concepts 
relating to the economics of banking like credit, capital requirements, liquidity, leverage, etc. 
see appendix 1. The existing regulatory system is currently being criticized for proving 
ineffective in dampening the recent boom-bust cycle in credit availability, leverage and 
housing prices (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). Regulators failed to tighten regulations on capital 
and liquidity during the period of economic growth prior to the crisis, and the efforts made by 
banks and other financial institutions to maximize short-term profits were in effect, largely 
unaffected by the prevailing regulatory system. It also took a long time before a relaxation of 
regulations came about during the subsequent recession to prevent their pro-cyclical effect 
(ibid).   
This thesis will focus on the importance of banks’ lending behavior and credit access 
prior to and during the two most recent crises in the Norwegian banking system. I will look at 
how inherent incentives and weaknesses in the banking system, where left unregulated, can be 
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a source of economic instability, and how the deterioration of bank capital and aggressive 
investment strategies and overextension during booms increase the chances of a subsequent 
crisis as the economy slows down. I will further argue that similar unfortunate circumstances 
may occur again in the absence of some important structural changes.  
Chapters 2 and 3 will go through the details of Norwegian Banking crisis 1988-1993 
and the recent financial crisis respectively. The focus will be on how banks have approached 
credit risk and capital requirements and how incentives in the credit market have affected their 
behavior prior to both crises. While my main concern is the Norwegian banking system, 
chapter 3 will also feature facts about subprime lending and some important international 
changes in banking. With the findings in this first part of my thesis as a basis, I will use chapter 
4 to ask some key questions about the banking system to be analyzed and answered during the 
second part.  
The model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) to be presented in detail in chapter 5 will be 
the point of departure for further analysis. The model categorizes Banks as financial 
intermediaries and proceeds to explain the relationship between these financial intermediaries, 
uninformed investors, and firms in the credit market of a stylized economy. The authors use 
contract theory to illustrate how aggregate investment is affected by a credit crunch and a 
capital squeeze, phenomena that typically occur during a recession or a financial crisis.  In fact, 
the model’s general predictions about the credit market fit the Norwegian banking crisis well 
and my thesis will test its explanatory powers on the experiences of the recent financial crisis, 
focusing on the systemic effects arising in the credit market as the economy goes from boom to 
bust.  
Chapter 6 will supplement the discussion with some relevant insights from other theories 
and will point to important aspects of the two banking crises not covered by model of the 
previous chapter. The thesis will present a limited, yet consistent body of economic theory and 
empirical examples to understand the workings of the market for bank loans prior to and during 
an economic slowdown, and use it to suggest some measures that can render the banking 
system more robust to adverse shocks. Changes are not implementable without a cost, but the 
recent economic turmoil and relevant developments within international financial regulation, 
will hopefully validate the claim that these changes are ultimately beneficial for the economy. 
Chapter 7 presents some insights into the evolution of bank regulation and concludes. 
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2 2 The Norwegian banking crisis 1988-1993 
In the 1980s, financial deregulation induced Norwegian banks to increase their lending activity 
and to compete for market shares by adopting an expansionist strategy. The result was in an 
aggregate expansion of credit. The following recollection of the Norwegian banking crisis will 
largely draw on the articles by Vale (2004), Steigum (2004) and Moe (2004).  
2.1 Quantitative loan restrictions and credit rationing 
Norwegian banks faced very little credit risk before the financial deregulation took place, due 
to the up until then, forced rationing of credit imposed by the government. As explained in 
Steigum (2004), a heavy national regulation of the banking sector had been in place since the 
end of World War II, and was having profound effects on how banks operated.  
Credit rationing implies that the demand for credit exceeds supply and can occur 
naturally in the market for bank loans even in the absence of regulation. Because of 
asymmetric information and adverse selection it may be optimal for a bank to deny some high 
risk applicants financing. However, it is worth mentioning that a pure credit rationing 
equilibrium comes with the additional requirement that, if two identical agents apply for a loan, 
then one might be rejected simply because credit is scarce (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
The government forced rationing of credit in Norway gave individual banks the 
incentive to thoroughly screen loan applicants, and they were thus being able to construct very 
safe asset portfolios with low delinquency rates. Vale (2004) notes that there was a continuous 
queue of unsatisfied credit demand, allowing banks to pick the best customers. Needless to say, 
the risks involved in commercial banking were very modest during this period. When the 
market was finally deregulated, the Norwegian banks had very little experience operating in a 
much more competitive environment. The credit expansion following deregulation predictably 
resulted in increased credit risk.  
2.2 Financial deregulation, credit expansion and price bubbles 
Deregulation became inevitable as Norwegian businesses gradually gained easier access to 
international financial markets and in 1984 the quantitative regulation on bank lending was 
lifted. Shortly after, in 1985 a cap on the maximum legal interest rate to be charged on bank 
loans was also removed. The result of these measures was a lending boom. The annual real 
growth in bank loans was above 20 percent. Simultaneously, there was a boom in the real 
estate market for both commercial and private property (Vale, 2004). Private consumption and 
investment increased dramatically, along with asset prices. Increasing asset prices, in turn, 
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helped fuel the expansion of bank lending since it was possible to get loans in proportion to the 
value of assets. The banks, on their part, required more liquid means in order to being able to 
grant a larger volume of loans to businesses and consumer. According to Steigum (2004) the 
lending boom was funded by short-term borrowing from abroad and liquidity loans from 
Norges Bank. In other words, the banking system needed more liquidity than what was 
available internally. Graph 1 illustrates the elevated real estate prices prevalent in Norway 
between the time of financial deregulation and when the general economy started to 
deteriorate. Note especially the more than doubling of commercial property prices, in real 
terms, in Oslo from 1982 to 1987. Such explosive growth partially justified the increased bank 
lending to businesses at the time. As long as real estate prices were expected to increase also in 
the future, there was enough collateral relative to debt in the market.   
                               
                             Graph 1: Norwegian real estate prices deflated by CPI. 
   
                                    Source: Steigum (2004). 
Graph 2 shows how the growth in bank credit closely followed the evolution of commercial 
real estate prices. Peaking at the time before the banking crisis and reaching the bottom as the 
crisis turned systemic in 1991-1992, at which point bank credit was actually contracting by ten 
percent. The drop of almost thirty percent in lending growth during the banking crises clearly 
illustrates how problems in the banking system can result in an aggregate credit crunch, 
something that will be discussed later using the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997). It is 
also clear, from looking at graph 2, that the development in supply of credit from banks closely 
resembles that of total real credit growth in the market.  
One other important restriction that was lifted, at the time of financial deregulation, was 
the banks’ previous inability to establish new branches wherever they wanted in the country. 
When geographical expansion suddenly became possible, the result was an intense competition 
for market shares. Banks tried to improve their positions, not only by increasing the volume of 
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lending at a national level, but also by becoming the dominant local actor in new locations. 
Many managers of newly opened branches were eagerly granting loans in order to outcompete 
other contestants, despite a lack of local knowledge and thus without the necessary quality 
controls. The compensation scheme for many branch managers was designed in such a way so 
that earnings were based on lending growth (Vale, 2004). The quantitative regulations of the 
Norwegian banking industry to control aggregate credit supply had worked as a substitute for 
monetary policy while they were in place. Capital reserves were kept very low, since the risks 
involved in bank lending were so modest at the time. 
                        
                           Graph 2: Norwegian real domestic credit growth deflated by CPI. 
 
                            Source: Steigum (2004). 
There had even been a relaxation of capital requirements since the early 1970s. Satisfactory 
capital requirements are presently considered important for the stability of a competitive 
banking industry because they allow banks to absorb loan losses, hence acting as buffers 
against insolvency. In order to be effective in this respect, they should be easy to write down to 
avoid liquidation (Norges Bank). As Norwegian banks faced a new market situation, with a 
higher level of competition, they did so with a small amount of easily down writable capital. 
From graph 3, we can see that reserves were reduced even further after the deregulation of the 
financial markets. This trend should arguably have been the opposite to compensate for the 
increased loan loss risks entailed in a more competitive environment. In addition, as stated by 
Vale (2004), the regulatory body approved perpetual subordinated debt as an adequate 
alternative to equity for fulfilling capital requirements. The decision followed strong demands 
from the banking industry which needed financing to maintain the high growth in bank 
lending. Subordinated debt is debt which ranks after other debt, should a company fall into 
receivership or be closed. This means that, in the case of liquidation of a business endeavor, the 
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holder of such debt is only repaid after the liquidator, tax authorities, and senior debt holders 
have been compensated. Although subordinated debt precedes stockholders in the hierarchy of 
repayment, it is necessarily quite risky since the liquidation value of a company might be too 
small in order to compensate all lenders. Its issuance is therefore a quite expensive source of 
finance for a bank since investors demand a high rate of return as a risk premium.    
      
   Graph 3: Capital reserves in Scandinavian commercial banks. 
  
      Source: Steigum (2004). 
The most relevant drawback however, is that subordinated debt is not particularly effective at 
absorbing losses. A degradation of bank capital works indirectly in the same way as reducing 
the amount of loss absorbing capital. The substitution of tier I capital for subordinated debt 
during an economic boom might therefore have serious consequences for a bank during a 
subsequent recession if it has to cope with some significant losses on its assets. Capital 
reserves were in fact not increased until after the banking crisis had ended. The issue of, what 
kinds of capital are considered safe enough to count as reserves is a work in progress for 
regulatory agencies, and new multinational guidelines are currently under development with 
Basel III. I will return to this later in the paper.           
2.3 From boom to bust 
Traditionally, systemic banking crises do not occur autonomously, but are triggered by 
negative shocks to the economy. A downturn in the business-cycle does not automatically 
entail significant problems for banks, but in the Norwegian case it turned out to be a necessary 
and sufficient condition for crisis. The lending boom following from the deregulation of the 
financial markets, combined with the fixed exchange rate regime in place at the time, left the 
Norwegian economy very exposed to adverse shocks (Steigum, 2004). Allen and Gale (1999) 
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write that asset bubbles usually occur when present credit levels are high and when future 
credit levels are uncertain, but the market expects them to increase. They note that this 
generalization is consistent with bubbles following financial deregulation. The Norwegian 
development towards a less restricted and market-oriented financial system caused both a 
credit expansion as well as uncertainty about future credit levels.  
The Norwegian economy is quite reliant on the price of oil, and in 1985 this fell 
sharply. Despite this, the business-cycle reached its height at the end of 1986 and the strength 
of the downturn during 1988-1989, triggering the banking crisis, came as a surprise (ibid). As 
the economy went from boom to bust, the real estate bubble also burst. Clients who had been 
able to borrow money from banks against the increasing value of their property were suddenly 
in a bad shape for repayment. The high interest rate on central bank loans, causing high market 
interest rates, worsened an already stressed situation. The fixed exchange rate regime in place 
at the time caused monetary policy to become pro-cyclical. There was little control of 
international capital movements and so, monetary policy could not be used to stabilize 
domestic demand.  
The Norwegian currency was pegged to the Deutsche Mark and in Germany, 
reunification of east and west made the economic priorities there very different from the ones 
in Norway. In addition, Norges bank was reluctant to devalue the NOK, hoping to improve its 
credibility in the international currency market. Lax reserve requirements along with a new 
competitive environment and a central bank focused on defending the fixed exchange rate, 
made the banking industry very vulnerable to negative macroeconomic shocks. Steigum (2004) 
writes in his paper, that the combination of a fixed exchange rate and financial deregulation 
was the most important cause of the Norwegian Banking crisis. In other words, although the 
expansionist strategy of commercial banks did not facilitate the crisis on its own, it contributed 
to the problem by making the banking system more exposed to fluctuations in the business-
cycle. The situation was not helped by Norges Bank’s inability to ease the situation through a 
lowering of the central bank interest rate. In fact, the fixed exchange rate policy forced all of 
the Nordic central banks to keep interests rates very high, instead of fighting recession by 
providing much needed stimulus to the economy.  
An alternative to monetary policy is of course financial policy, like for example tax 
breaks. Financial policy is hard to implement at a short notice however, since changes in 
legislation typically has a long inside lag. A high central bank interest rate implies a high rate 
on interbank loans, and typically also a high market rate. Either way, banks’ profits from 
interest rate spreads will erode if lenders are unwilling to accept more expensive loans. Hence, 
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monetary policy contributed to deepening the troubles in the financial markets. In addition to 
this, there had been a postponement of several problems in the 1970s, and Norwegian 
economic policy was presented with vast challenges at the beginning of the 1980s (Steigum, 
2004). While the deterioration of the private housing market was part of pressuring the banking 
industry, the largest losses came from loans to businesses. Some individual small and medium 
sized banks got into trouble before the crisis became systemic, and so there was a fear that the 
problems might spread to larger, more important banks.   
2.4 Government intervention  
Vale (2004) writes that almost a quarter of commercial bank lending was to foreign investors 
in the early stages of the crisis and the Norwegian government had to restore market 
confidence to prevent an outflow of foreign capital. Such a flight of capital would have left 
Norwegian banks with significant liquidity problems. The height of the crisis materialized in 
the years 1991-1992 at which point it was systemic and the Norwegian government had to 
intervene on a large scale. Shares of key domestic banks were written down to zero and as a 
result the government, considering them too large to fail, ended up as a major or sole owner of 
last resort. In March 1991 the Government Bank Insurance Fund was established and initially 
capitalized with five billion NOK. Only a half year later, another six billion had to be injected 
into the fund. This was done to restore confidence in the banking industry. 
At approximately the same time Christiania Bank, the second largest Norwegian bank, 
publicly announced that its entire equity capital was lost. The government responded quickly 
by pledging to provide additional share capital to avoid bankruptcy. Later, both the largest 
Norwegian bank, DnB and another significant actor, Fokus Bank encountered similar problems 
and the government had to get involved once again. The reason, according to Steigum (2004), 
as to why the shares of Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank were subsequently written down to 
zero, was their high losses and a lack of confidence in their continued stability from private 
investors The shares of DnB were initially written down by 90 percent and then finally all the 
way down to zero in 1992. In under a year, the Norwegian government had become the 
dominant owner of DnB and the sole owner of Christiania Bank and Fokus Bank. In the years 
following the banking crisis, the value of the governments shares increased substantially and it 
actually ended up profiting on the rescue operation by diminishing its ownership positions.  
The Norwegian government believed that the banking industry would have to be 
brought back to full functionality for the aggregate economy to recover and was hence able to 
effectively prevent the crisis from having a more profound effect on the real economy. In Japan 
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during the 1997 crisis of the East Asian economies, the assumption was the opposite, namely 
that when the macro situation improved, the credit markets would recover. Allen and Gale 
(1999) argue that the lack of intervention by the Japanese government caused the crisis to be 
much more long lived than the Norwegian one, to an extent legitimating the government 
ownership described above. It would appear that a solution to the banking problem is required 
to restore economic growth. Steigum (2004) claims, that it is unclear whether the presence of a 
strong bank supervisory authority during the lending boom could have dampened the severity 
of the subsequent crisis. He notes however, that a stricter capital adequacy requirement for 
Norwegian banks could have strongly reduced its magnitude or perhaps even led to its 
avoidance altogether. In the next chapter, we will see that the intensified fragility of the 
banking industry resulting from weak capital reserves was a recurring theme also during the 
recent financial crisis.      
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3 The subprime financial crisis 2007- 
 
The recent financial crises came about after many years of international economic growth. 
Simultaneously there had been a general underestimation of risk in the financial markets. The 
economic development prior to the crisis was characterized by low interest rates paired with a 
significant appetite for risk from investors who only suffered minor losses. The combination of 
these factors laid the foundation for an increasing debt, in addition to booming asset prices and 
property prices in the US and several European countries. The growing debt of many 
industrialized economies was partly financed by capital flows from emerging economies with a 
high propensity to save (Norges Bank, 2008). China was and still is the most important 
emerging economy with its astounding average annual GDP growth of almost 9 percent for the 
preceding decade.
1
 This European and American dependence on emerging economies 
contributed to significant imbalances in the world economy. Large foreign exchange deficits in 
industrialized and already indebted countries, most notably the US, were made possible 
through comparable surpluses in emerging economies.
2
 During the same period, the prevalence 
of low risk premiums in the financial markets boosted a strong, market financed, growth in the 
balance sheets of banks while regulatory shortcomings allowed financial institutions to operate 
with a very small share of equity capital (ibid).  
The financial crisis was eventually triggered in 2007 by failings in the US property 
markets. Due to interwoven financial markets, the problems spread quickly to other 
overextended economies. Liquidity in the interbank markets dried up as the perceived credit 
risks suddenly increased. At the beginning of the crisis, central banks injected short-term 
liquidity into the banking systems to prevent solvent banks from experiencing large financing 
problems. These measures soon proved insufficient however and more extensive rescue 
packages had to be designed (ibid). I will return to the resolution of the financial crisis in 
Norway later.   
 
3.1 Securitization and risk taking 
Although a rather complicated subject, it is impossible to cover the financial crisis without 
mentioning the fairly modern practice of securitization. Prior to the subprime crisis in 2007, 
                                                          
1
 Average GDP growth in China adjusted by inflation from Sept. 1997 to Sept. 2007 was 8.84 percent. Data from: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=CNY  
2
 As of June 30. 2009, accumulated US foreign debt stands at $13,450,000,000,000. Data from: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2079rank.html  
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many traditional banks managed to boost their borrowing and lending activities without 
violating minimum capital requirements, by adopting the “originate and distribute” banking 
model. Traditionally, commercial banks held loans on their balance sheets and were directly 
subjected to their risks. In the “originate and distribute” model the loans are pooled together, 
made into financial products and resold via securitization to a third party (Brunnermeier, 
2009).  
There are several classes of asset backed securities (ABS). Their risk and value depend 
on their relation to, as well as the quality of, the underlying asset pool. Mortgage backed 
securities (MBS) are financial products constructed from a more or less diversified group of 
mortgages with various expectancy of default. These naturally became widespread throughout 
the banking industry since banks are the prime granter of such loans. At the end of 2006 the 
nominal value of American mortgages was approximately $ 10 200 billion and about 55 
percent of these were used as collateral for securities sold to investors around the globe. The 
market for securities backed by American mortgages prior to the financial crisis was in fact 
larger than the market for American government bonds and represented more than 10 percent 
of worldwide securitized debt. 12-15 percent of securitized mortgages were categorized as 
subprime, meaning that they had a relatively high risk of default (Norges Bank, 2007).  
A particular class of ABS’s that has been widely mentioned in relation to the financial 
crisis is referred to as collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The simplified process of issuing 
CDO’s is as follows: A bank constructs and values a pool of mortgages. It can then sell the 
claim to these loans as a bond to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). SPV’s are often created by 
banks and their sole function is to trade in securitized paper. In fact, an important reason for the 
development of SPV’s was a loophole in the old Basel I regulations, which allowed them to 
operate independently of the banks from which bonds were bought. Neither were they subject 
to financial supervision or capital regulations. This enabled banks to move a considerable 
amount of risky loans off their balance sheets. Initially many SPV’s also enjoyed solid credit 
ratings, although these necessarily suffered when the economic boom ended and the perceived 
risks of ABS’s increased (Norges Bank, 2007). An SPV finances its investments by 
deconstructing and reselling the asset backed securities to investors. One important trait of a 
CDO is that the claim to the underlying asset pool is often divided into tranches with different 
risk profiles. The three main categories of trances are; senior tranches, mezzanine tranches and 
junior- or equity tranches. The safest of these securities, included in the senior tranche, promise 
to pay out their owners first in case of defaults or lacking repayments in the mortgage pool, and 
hence they often receive AAA ratings. The equity and mezzanine tranches are far more risky. 
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In a representative example they might be valued at 10 percent of the CDO, but are subject to 
90 percent of the underlying risk (Rakkestad and Weme, 2006). Investors willing to buy such 
paper would typically require a high rate of return. If the CDO is viewed as similar to an 
insurance policy, this would translate to high risk payments to the investor and a low premium 
in case of default. Without going into specifics, there are several types of CDO’s. A cash flow 
CDO pays investors when mortgage payments occur on time and is thus directly tied to the 
profitability of underlying mortgages. A synthetic CDO is more complicated since the SPV 
does not acquire the securitized mortgage portfolio, but rather credit derivatives. The 
construction of CDO’s became so complicated in some cases that rating agencies struggled to 
determine their true value. In addition, many tranches were designed to barely meet the 
requirements for an AAA rating and these were quickly downgraded once the economic 
situation deteriorated. Uncertain valuation became a source of much distrust during the 
financial crisis and rating agencies were accused of having rated securities too optimistically 
(ibid).  
Simultaneously as securitization became increasingly popular in the banking industry, 
there was a blending of traditional bank activities and investment banking. Investment banking 
is different from commercial banking. Commercial banks offer various corporate financial 
services that attend to the specific needs of private venture. They mainly convert short-term 
deposits into long-term loans. However, they will not service investment activities in financial 
markets. An investment bank on the other hand is more similar in nature to a mutual fund. It 
attracts investment from the market and uses these funds to invest in a wide range of 
enterprises, industries and financial markets. Where the two forms of banking used to be 
separated they now became merged.
3
 One consequence of this development was that universal 
banks also speculated in asset backed securities, meaning that banks ended up holding part of 
the risk that securitization had allowed them to get rid of in the first place.  
3.2 Crisis and credit crunch 
The “originate and distribute” model led to a decline in lending standards as the ability to 
transfer risk by selling mortgage backed securities to a third party led to an unprecedented 
credit expansion. The credit expansion in turn, helped fuel the boom in housing prices 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). As long as both aggregate credit and housing prices were increasing 
simultaneously, the gearing of banks’ balance sheets was allowed to go on. Credit availability 
                                                          
3
 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 allowed commercial banks (referring to traditional banking activities), 
investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to merge. Naturally many banks did. The 
combination of commercial banking and investment banking is commonly referred to as universal banking. 
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ensured that the housing bubble could continue to expand, while the increasing housing prices 
kept the risks of the MBS’s issued by banks relatively low. This development bears a strong 
resemblance to the previously described situation in Norway prior to the Scandinavian crisis 
almost two decades earlier. Knowing about business-cycles, and drawing on past experiences 
with bubbles, it is clear that this practice could not possibly persist, but in an intensively 
competitive banking industry there was a resistance towards backing out of the process before 
the risks started to manifest themselves as increased losses.   
The industry average earnings a bank manager generates typically works as a 
benchmark for the quality of the individual manager’s performance. He is thus held responsible 
if the revenues produced by his bank, are less than those of comparable bank (Diamond and 
Rajan, 2009). The short-term incentives, in an industry where performance-based 
compensation is common practice, are in other words not compatible with safety and longevity. 
Citigroup Chairman Chuck Prince has been widely cited for his quote to the Financial Times 
on why his bank kept financing buyouts despite mounting risks. “When the music stops, in 
terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got 
to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Financial Times: July 10, 2007). Arguably the music 
had already stopped at the time his quote was published.  
The crisis was triggered by an increased delinquency rate in the American market for 
mortgages to borrowers with a low credit rating, also known as subprime mortgages. 
Generally, a loan is deemed delinquent when payments are three or more months overdue. 
Private borrowers had been able to get mortgages, sometimes without collateral or a reliable 
source of income, since the future market prices of their housing investments were expected to 
increase. Naturally, the risks of granting such loans are high and strongly tied to market 
fluctuations. The market for subprime loans expanded rapidly over the first half of the previous 
decade. The share of American mortgages categorized as subprime increased from 8 percent in 
2001 to 20 percent in 2006. Meanwhile, the share of subprime mortgages that had been 
securitized grew from 54 percent to 75 percent and the general quality of the market had fallen 
significantly and continuously in the process (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009). The disturbances 
spread to the money and credit markets when it became clear that several banks in the US and 
Europe would have to include loss bearing loans on their own balance sheets (ibid). The loans 
were brought back onto the balance sheets due to reputational concerns and financing problems 
and once there, they became subjected to capital requirements. Uncertainty concerning the true 
value of complex securities and the financial situation of their owners, as well as generally 
reduced expectations about future economic growth, caused market liquidity and financing to 
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contract. Norwegian banks did not have any unregulated off-balance-sheet assets, but their 
lending growth was still significant, which made them exposed to the effects of market 
fluctuations (Norges Bank, 2009). Financial institutions without any investments in the market 
for American subprime mortgages were affected by the crisis due to this reduced liquidity in 
the money markets (Demyanyk and Hermert, 2009).  
The financial crisis had, with the benefit of hindsight, many predictable boom-bust 
characteristics. It was preceded by a significant credit expansion, as well as growth in property 
markets and the stock market. Both financial markets and countries had become heavily 
dependent on borrowing against future income and increasing asset prices. The crisis itself 
came about as the economy was slowing down and stocks and properties were written down to 
their true underlying values, realizing the postponed investment risks of the preceding period. 
The turmoil in international markets has caused serious problems for banks through at least 
three channels: Losses stemming from investments in securities, increased loan losses and 
finally, an insufficient supply of liquidity from the credit markets (Norges Bank, 2007). Figure 
1 shows an overall assessment of the risks and conditions in global financial markets. The 
further from the middle a point is located the higher its value.  
 
Figure 1: Risks and conditions in global financial markets 
Emerging market risks                      Credit risks 
 
 October 2008 
April 2009 
 
              
            
         Macroeconomic                                                                                                                      Market and 
         risks                                                                                                                                        liquidity risks 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
                                          Monetary and financial conditions            Risk appetite 
            Source: IMF (2008). 
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3.3 The Norwegian experience  
So far, Norwegian banks have fared better throughout the financial crisis than many of their 
foreign counterparts and this notion is attributable to several factors. Prior to the crisis, 
Norwegian banks experienced a period of prolonged growth and they have maintained their 
solidity with assistance from the government. The losses stemming from their lending activity 
have materialized later than in other countries. This is partly due to Norway’s strong economy, 
but also because the Norwegian banking sector only constitutes a small share of GDP 
compared to the banking sectors in other industrialized and even Scandinavian countries. 
Furthermore, the activities of Norwegian banks abroad are quite limited which may have 
contributed to curtail contagion (Norges Bank, 2008).  
Securities in general do not account for a large fraction of the assets owned by 
Norwegian banks, as they mainly invest by lending to households and firms. An important 
reason for this is simply that the nationally owned share of the Norwegian banking system 
consists of many small and a few medium sized banks that are prevented by their size of 
operations from competing in financial markets on a major scale. DnB NOR, the largest 
Norwegian bank, which has a substantial trading portfolio is an exception. The low and volatile 
stock prices caused by the financial crisis, had an adverse effect on DnB NOR’s solvency gap 
as well as that of Nordea, which although a Swedish bank, has the second largest market share 
in Norway (Norges Bank, 2009).
4
 The majority of the Norwegian banking system avoided such 
problems however and even though the crises eroded much of the down writable equity issued 
by banks through stocks and bonds on their liabilities side, the aggregate losses from asset 
securities were modest. As a representation of the dramatic deterioration of financial papers 
caused by the crisis, the Norwegian stock market main index (OSEBX) plummeted from a near 
all time high of 522 points on the 22
nd
 of May 2008, to a mere 190 points on December 5
th
 of 
the same year, a 64 percent drop.
5
 The banks also successfully avoided any involvement with 
subprime securities and were therefore not directly exposed to the heavy losses associated with 
American MBS’s (Norges Bank, 2008). They were generally neither involved in investment 
banking activities like their larger American counterparts, causing them to be less affected by 
the drastic changes in the international financial markets, although DnB NOR, again being the 
exception, had to take a write down because of subprime (Werdigier, 2007).  
                                                          
4
 The solvency gap is how many standard deviations the value of a bank’s assets can fall before its capital 
requirement is violated. 
5
 Numbers from OSEBX graph at http://www.euroinvestor.no/stock/chart.aspx?id=340348 
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It deserves a mention that Norwegian banks themselves had used a type of securitization to 
finance their lending growth since June 2007. At that point in time the banks were allowed to 
issue covered bonds using mortgages and loans to businesses as collateral, but these financial 
instruments are not to be confused with asset backed securities like the CDO’s mentioned 
earlier. The Norwegian version of covered bonds, are called OMF. 
6
 They provide an investor with a 
senior claim to a pool of the bank’s assets and are sold through a credit institution. The 
institutions involved in the trading of OMF are subject to the same regulatory and supervisory 
framework as banks and are therefore quite different from SPV’s involved in the securitization 
of subprime mortgages. Furthermore unlike CDO’s, the OMF are not divided into tranches and 
there are strict regulations concerning their underlying pool of assets. The asset pools mainly 
consist of mortgages and loans to businesses where the borrowers’ debt cannot exceed 75 
percent of the collateral’s value (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010).  
OMF can usually be issued to investors on better terms than bank bonds or unsecured 
loans since they are considered relatively safe investments. An OMF that is deemed to be of a 
satisfactory quality and meets the detailed conditions of the Capital Requirements Directive 
also gains a low risk weight of 10 percent, which means that their issuance enable banks to 
increase their lending while maintaining a low level of equity capital (ibid).
7
 These two useful 
features quickly made OMF’s a popular source of financing for banks and in 2010 their 
aggregate value stands at approximately 470 billion NOK. Although the Norwegian market for 
OMF is still in its infancy, it has proven robust during the financial crisis and as an optional 
source of financing for banks, OMF have contributed to financial stability (Bakke and 
Rakkestad, 2010). OMF’s have also enabled a higher lending growth from banks however, 
which may contribute to pro-cyclical banking and credit supply, but the quality regulations in 
place prevents unrestricted lending to borrowers. The fact that investors have the senior claim 
to some of the banks safest assets may be a cause for concern. If property prices fall like they 
did during the financial crisis, the value of an OMF may follow suite if many of the underlying 
loans suddenly exceed 75 percent of the reduced collateral and have to be removed from the 
pool. An important distinction between ABS’s and OMF is that, while both enable banks to 
increase their lending activities, OMF do not remove the asset risks from the balance sheets of 
banks and therefore does not encourage risk seeking behavior in the same way as normal 
securitization. 
                                                          
6
 OMF stands for: Obligasjoner med fortrinnsrett (plural). 
12 
The CRD is a set of guidelines from the EU concerning how much equity capital a credit institution must hold in 
proportion to its various categories of assets. Assets are given different weights depending on their risk 
characteristics. A relatively safe asset gets a low risk weight (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010). 
P a g e  | 17 
 
One of the main concerns for Norwegian banks during the financial crisis was their 
need to renew their financing. During the crisis it became difficult for the banks to obtain credit 
in the market. This posed a problem since market financing had developed into an important 
source of funding as the banks’ lending growth had exceeded that of deposits for several years 
(Finanstilsynet, 2006). Their dependence on private investment exposed the banks to the 
disturbances in the international credit markets brought about by the subprime crisis. 
Especially banks that had based their operations on a large share of short-term financing and 
had significant asset shares in economic sectors exposed to losses, experienced difficulties 
trying to renew these loans (Norges Bank, 2008). Under normal market conditions, short-term 
financing is cheaper than long-term financing. The intuition behind this is simply that the 
uncertainty of future repayment increases with a longer time to maturity. Investors need to be 
compensated for unforeseen circumstances, through a risk premium and the distant future is 
necessarily more difficult to predict and therefore requires a higher premium. Simultaneously, 
investments that are tied up cannot be used to exploit market opportunities which increase 
investors’ opportunity cost of providing long-term financing. To support their lending growth 
prior to the financial crisis it was thus profitable for the banks to use short-term funding, which 
was easily accessible while the lending boom lasted. As boom turned to bust, access to both 
long-term and short-term financing dried up, but the largest problems were naturally associated 
with the short-term financing since it was more likely to require renewing while the crisis 
lasted. If a bank struggles to obtain funding, it will have to rein in on its own lending activities, 
which in turn can have serious effects for businesses heavily reliant on bank loans. During a 
credit crunch it can therefore be both difficult and expensive for businesses to get loans and 
firms that need to refinance their debt encounter obstacles in the credit market. Norwegian 
banks did in fact reduce their lending to firms during the crisis and they also announced that 
they would prioritize existing customers over new applicants when supplying credit. Many 
firms were also denied debt financing in the securities market (Norges Bank, 2009). This 
relates strongly to the theory by Holmström and Tirole (1997) to be presented later. The graphs 
below illustrate the significant loan volume growth for banks with both foreign and Norwegian 
ownership prior to the crisis: Graph 5 is for private customers and graph 6 is for business 
customers. 
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 Graph 4: Loan growth to private customers       Graph 5: Loan growth to businesses 
 
  Source: Finanstilsynet (2006). 
                           
Both graphs show a notable increase in loan volume growth to businesses from Norwegian 
banks before the financial crisis in 2007, although exceeded by that of foreign branches during 
the same period. Simultaneously, as can be seen from graph 6 below, there was a reduction in 
Norwegian banks of both total capital coverage and core capital coverage.
8
 The aggregate core 
capital coverage for the Norwegian banking industry was 8.6 percent at the end of 2006. Total 
capital coverage was at 11.2 percent. All of the banks satisfied the demand for minimum 
capital coverage, which was at 8 percent and only five banks had core capital coverage lower 
than 8 percent. During the crisis, many banks sought to strenghten their core capital to improve 
their access to financing through bonds. This required a higher income, which depositors and 
lenders had to pay for through low interest rates on deposits and a high interst margin on loans 
(Norges Bank, 2009). 
 
                               Graph 6: Capital coverage of Norwegian banks. 
  
                          Source: Finanstilsynet (2006).      
Graph 7 on the next page shows the evolution of capital shares in major Norwegian banks in 
the wake of the financial crisis. The share is similar to 2006 levels, but it is important to 
                                                          
8
 Core capital coverage is a mixture of equity and accepted hybrid capital. It is a risk weighted measure of a 
bank’s solvency and should be easy to write down when asset values are reduced (Norges Bank, 2009). 
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remember that the banking industry is still in a state of recovery, meaning that we will have to 
wait for some time before we might see a change in the “business as usual” capital levels. The 
graph also shows a uniform increase in capital levels from 2008 to 2009.  As illustrated in 
graph 4 and 5, the growth in deposits from private customers prior to the financial crisis was 
15.6 percent in 2006, while the growth in deposits from business customers was particularly 
high. The strong growth in the total volume of deposits was, however, not sufficient in order to 
prevent a deterioration of the deposit coverage for loans to customers. From graph 8 one can 
see a clear downward trend in the deposit volume-to-loan volume ratio, reaching its lowest 
point at 62.3 percent in 2006. The very favorable macro situation in the years prior to the 
financial crisis contributed to a continued reduction in loan defaults in 2006. The gross default 
rate on loans to customers was only 0.6 percent by the end of the year. By 2008 the banks’ loan 
losses started to increase and by the end of the year, they had put aside considerable means to 
counter further future losses from highly exposed industries like shipping. The number of 
defaults from loans to businesses did indeed increase in the first quarter of 2009 before starting 
to diminish later in the year (Norges Bank, 2009). 
 
                              Graph 7: Capital reserves in percent for large Norwegian banks.  
 
                                 Source: Finanstilsynet (2006). 
All these numbers seem to a hypothesis of pro-cyclical banking not only prior to the 
Norwegian banking crisis at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, but also before the latest 
financial crisis. Whether the low amount of loan defaults in 2006 means that the aggregate 
portfolio of Norwegian bank loans was relatively safe under normal conditions, or whether 
there was simply a postponement of risk due to the favorable macro situation, is hard to tell 
from these numbers alone.  
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                         Graph 8: Deposit coverage for loans for Norwegian banks.  
 
                                Source: Finanstilsynet (2006). 
                          Graph 9: Percentage of loan defaults.  
 
                                Source: Finanstilsynet (2006). 
3.4 The Terra scandal of 2007 
Even though Norwegian commercial banks avoided involvement in American mortgage 
backed securities speculation, there was a serious incident involving several local governments 
and an investment company in the fall of 2007. Four Norwegian municipalities had invested 
heavily in collateralized debt obligations created by Citigroup and sold through the investment 
company Terra Securities. Terra Securities was the investment banking arm, owned by the 
Terra Gruppen which is jointly owned by 77 local savings banks according to their website
9
. 
The group is frequently used as the main supplier of financing for local communities in 
Norway and in 2007 it had a market share of 6.5 percent of the Norwegian banking market.   
The securities themselves were very complicated, but were essentially derived from US 
mortgages in the way I described earlier and subject to significant gearing increasing the 
investment risk. The municipalities of Narvik, Hattfjelldal, Rana and Hemnes had invested a 
total of 451 million NOK. In the end, 350 million NOK were lost as the investments 
plummeted to 55 percent of their original value (Werdigier, 2007). What made this episode 
particularly controversial was the fact that the municipalities had used future income from local 
                                                          
9
 Terra Group website: http://www.terra.no/Sider/default.aspx The scandal is summed up in a four-word  sentence. 
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energy production as a source of financing. After the investment was sunk, they had essentially 
bankrupted themselves and in addition temporarily interrupted important future income. To set 
an example, the Norwegian minister of finance at the time said that the centralized government 
was unlikely to bail them out (ibid). As is to be expected after such an event, there was a 
prolonged search for someone to take the blame. The municipalities’ representatives claimed to 
have been wrongfully informed, during presentations by Terra, about the true risk of the 
securities they had bought, and they even tried to sue. Terra Securities was eventually closed 
down due to its tainted reputation. Truth be told, the municipalities had made a serious gamble 
with public resources, gearing an already risky investment through lending.   
3.5 Government intervention 
The central bank and the government made several efforts to improve liquidity and alleviate 
the impact of the financial crisis on Norwegian banks and the financial system in general. 
Some of the most notable measures were; the lowering of the central banks interest rate, an 
increase of longer term loans from the central bank, an arrangement to swap OMF against 
government bonds and the formation of two government investment funds. DnB NOR also 
received large capital injections.  
Since government bonds are more easily traded than OMF, the government’s offer to 
let banks swap OMF for government bonds improved their liquidity situation. By May 2009, 
230 billion NOK had been distributed in bonds through auctions administered by the central 
bank (Bakke and Rakkestad, 2010). Because the assets used as collateral for OMF had been 
subject to strict qualitative regulation, the swap arrangement did not involve any serious 
gamble with the taxpayers’ money, but functioned as a temporary improvement of the strained 
liquidity situation in the banking industry. The need for the swap arrangement has diminished 
as the ability to issue OMF in traditional investor markets has improved (ibid).  
To provide banks with a stable source of credit, the central bank increased its issuance 
of F-loans to the industry. An F-loan is the primary instrument used by the Norwegian central 
bank to provide liquidity to the banking system and has a longer time to maturity than regular 
overnight loans. They are given against collateral in the form of securities and have an ex-ante 
specified rate of interest and maturity. The maturity differs in accordance with the liquidity 
situation in the banking system. The interest rates on F-loans are normally determined by 
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multi-price auctions. Norges Bank decides the aggregate amount of loans to be provided and 
the banks’ interest rate bids are ranked in descending order.10  
The two government funds that were formed, namely Statens Finansfond and Statens 
Obligasjonsfond each received 50 billion NOK in capital to invest in financial instruments 
from banks, as well as from other financial and non-financial institutions. Its mandate was to 
firstly invest in instruments from institutions with a high credit rating. Once again, the goal was 
to improve the liquidity situation in financial markets (Norges Bank 2009). A regulatory rule of 
thumb for public intervention in financial markets is that institutions should be aided against 
illiquidity, but not against insolvency. Problems arise when an insolvent institution is 
considered to be too large to fail, because its liquidation will have severe adverse effects on the 
economy. I will return to this topic later.  
A low central bank interest rate allowed banks to earn increased risk premiums on their 
lending interest rate, while keeping deposit rates low. This measure improved liquidity in the 
interbank market in which the perceived counterparty risk was high. Initially during the crisis, 
risk premiums were sizable, but due to government and central bank interventions the interest 
rates on loans started to come down (ibid).  
3.6 Developments in international banking regulation  
In 1991 Norway implemented the first guidelines from the Basel Committee, the Basel I 
accord. The accord was subsequently adopted by the Group of Ten in 1992,
11
 With Basel I, 
banks were subjected to capital requirements of at least 8 percent and the requirements for an 
individual banks were tied to the risks associated with that banks’ assets, for example its loans 
(Norges Bank, 2009). In 2007 the transition to Basel II began and soon after on November 20. 
2008, drawing on the experiences of the financial crisis, the Committee adopted a strategy to 
rectify apparent weaknesses in financial regulation, monitoring and the risk managing in banks. 
The goal was to improve upon the Basel II framework and more attention was devoted to bank 
assets that are held off the balance sheets and liquidity risk (ibid). Basel II had attracted 
criticism for possibly contributing to pro-cyclical banking. It had put a larger emphasis than 
Basel I on tying capital requirements to measured asset risk.  
                                                          
10
 Information on F-loans from Norges Bank’s homepage:                                                                      
http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____69602.aspx  
11
 The Group of Ten (which had eleven members at the time) refers to the following economies: The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and 
Sweden (Source: IMF). 
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During economic booms asset risks are perceived to be relatively low, as was the case prior 
both the Norwegian banking crisis and the financial crisis for several consecutive years. When 
the economy is finally slowing down, the asset risks increase. A capital requirement strictly 
tied to present or past asset risk does not necessarily account for the effects of a strong 
recession like the financial crisis. It can therefore become pro-cyclical as it prescribes banks to 
increase their capital levels during recessions rather than periods of strong economic growth 
(ibid). Currently the Basel III accord is being developed, in addition to the augmentations for 
the CRD as the new international framework for bank regulation, and presently there are 
suggestions that banks should build up capital buffers during booms to counter future losses. 
Capital requirements will still be related to asset risks, but the risks should be calculated as if 
the economy is growing at an average pace, even if it’s booming to prevent pro-cyclicality 
(ibid). The minimum quantitative capital requirements, as well as the qualitative standards of 
capital have to be raised to reinforce banks against financial stress scenarios. Banks will have 
to use periods of economic growth to build up buffers of such capital to be readily available 
during recessions and they should satisfy an additional minimum capital requirement 
independently of the risk weighted capital requirement (ibid). In addition to controlling the 
relative amount of bank capital directly, the committee wants to put restrictions on what it calls 
unsustainable balance-sheet growth of banks,
12
 so that there is a limit to leveraging, or gearing, 
of capital. That is, how much money in loans and deposits that can be held per unit of capital, 
in relative terms. As a concrete example, the committee is working on a leverage ratio, 
measured as high quality capital over total market exposure. In short, the Basel Committee 
wants to strengthen the level of capital in the banking system to make it more robust, as was 
made clear in a press release on the twelfth of March 2009.  
  
                                                          
12
 A letter from the European Business Council provides an executive summary of developments in the CRD: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ebc/info-letter/200909_en.pdf 
Another summary of Basel II, CRD and future developments can be found here: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/basel/index.shtml 
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4 A tentative comparison of the two crises and the road ahead 
The presentations of both the Norwegian banking crisis and the recent financial crisis 
respectively, form the necessary basis to examine how they compare in a few key areas. 
Chapter 2 and 3 intentionally focused on variables such as credit, capital, liquidity and asset 
risk and these variables will also be the center of attention in further discussion. Unlike the 
resolution of the Norwegian banking crisis which involved a more serious intervention, the 
Norwegian government did not have to assume ownership of failed banks to keep the system 
working during the financial crisis. This shows that the financial crisis proved less severe for 
the Norwegian banking system, but also supports the proposition that the banks had taken a 
significant step away from the risky investment strategies of the late 80s. The main 
disturbances stemmed from illiquidity in international money markets and a dependence on 
short-term financing and not a direct exposure to subprime securities. In terms of pro-cyclical 
banking, there are some similarities however. Both crises were preceded by periods of 
economic growth and booming property prices, fueling a considerable expansion of credit. The 
lending growth from Norwegian banks was also financed by an increasing share of short-term 
debt in both cases and by issuing OMF since 2007. Once affected by the economic downturns 
of interest the banks had to rein in on their own lending, thus affecting firms dependent on the 
access to bank financing.   
The organization of Norwegian financial markets was quite different in the late 1980s 
than in 2007 however. Whereas Norwegian bank managers in the 1980s were exposed to 
sudden market changes due to financial de-regulation, by 2007 they had grown accustomed to 
operating in a competitive environment and the most profitable opportunities for new branch 
expansions had been exploited. The systemic crisis in 1991-1992 had also taught the industry 
and the regulators a valuable lesson about the possible consequences of banks overextending 
their lending to risky borrowers. The average capital reserves of commercial banks were 
increased to strengthen their buffers against insolvency. In international financial markets 
however, there was an escalation in the use financial innovation. In 2007, the process of 
securitization which previously had allowed banks to increase their lending and profits became 
a source of high asset risk and heavy losses. Although regulatory progress, like the adoption of 
the Basel I framework, paved the way for a safer banking industry, it seems like the banks 
through the use of financial innovation found, at least to an extent, a way around the 
restrictions by moving assets off the balance sheet to finance a high lending growth. In 
addition, previously strictly commercial banks had ventured into investment banking activities 
and universal banking became more commonplace, although size prevented most Norwegian 
P a g e  | 25 
 
banks from such a development. Some macroeconomic differences and similarities also 
deserve a mention.  
The price of oil dropped before the Norwegian banking crisis, and because of the 
financial crisis. Although the oil price is not directly related to the credit market, the revenues 
of oil related companies are important to the Oslo stock exchange, and the general shape of the 
stock market is in turn important for other financial markets and for attracting foreign 
investment.   
An important change that took place in between crises was the abandonment of the 
fixed exchange rate system. The exacerbation of financial problems caused by high central 
bank interest rates during the Norwegian banking crisis, as well as a speculative attack against 
the currency had led to this decision. Norway, like the other Scandinavian countries, currently 
uses a floating exchange rate regime, and monetary policy focuses on inflation targeting. This 
conversion allowed Norges Bank to stimulate the economy, by lowering its interest rates 
during the recent financial crisis. Low central bank interest rates allow banks to profit on high 
margins, by keeping their own interest rates on lending high. The interest rate on lending is 
essentially a risk premium and in an interbank market with liquidity problems, such 
compensation for risk can stimulate lending between banks, as well as to the general public. 
During the financial crisis, there was a significant lack of trust in the interbank market, 
especially in the US where it was very difficult to verify which banks were stuck with the 
worst mortgage securities and liquidity problems.  
The financial crisis then caused a widespread problem of illiquidity in financial markets 
and banking systems around the world. The situation was particularly dire for the institutions 
that had been heavily involved in subprime securities speculation, but it also made a serious 
impact on several banks and other financial corporations with no direct involvement, that came 
under pressure due to local and cross country contagion. This was true in the case of the 
Norwegian banking system. Financial markets have become increasingly interdependent and 
more responsive to each other, on short notice, on a global level. This means that the 
Norwegian banking system not only has to safeguard against stress stemming from local 
occurrences, but also against shocks coming from abroad. The banking system’s sensitivity to 
fluctuations in international financial markets is of course nothing new, but the speed at which 
capital flows can possibly shift, makes it even more vital to consider when deciding on sensible 
levels of reserve requirements and exposure to market-risk for banks. Like the subprime 
financial crisis clearly demonstrated in the Norwegian case; even a soundly functioning 
P a g e  26 | 
 
banking system, situated in a strong economy, can become illiquid as investments in the 
international markets dry up.  
The model by Holmström and Tirole from 1997 to be introduced in detail in the next 
chapter includes two important features for further analysis. Firstly, it illustrates the unique 
importance of bank credit for economic efficiency and stability, and secondly, it uses its setup 
to demonstrate what happens to the credit market when the economy is hit by a shock. Before 
reading further, it can be helpful to consider the following questions: 
Both the Norwegian banking crisis and the financial crisis had boom-bust 
characteristics with economic growth and a credit expansion followed by recession and a credit 
crunch. Banks play an important part in keeping the credit supply stable, but chapter 2 and 3 
showed that they can contribute to quite the opposite. How does a volatile supply of credit 
affect the real economy? 
During the financial crisis, banks experienced difficulties obtaining financing from 
investors in the market. The economic downturn had increased risk premiums for investors and 
financing became scarce and more expensive. This in turn, caused banks to rein in on their own 
lending to firms. To fund the lending growth in the periods prior to both crises, banks used an 
increasing amount of short-term financing, which deepened their problems once they were 
required to renew these loans during a credit crunch. How do the banks’ financing problems in 
a credit crunch affect the composition of firms in the economy as well as the composition of 
their financing?   
Banks have the ability to monitor investments, something that will be explained shortly, 
and can therefore grant loans to projects that are too small and risky to attract private 
investment. They are among other things the main suppliers of mortgages in Norway and 
because of this, the banks’ lending activities are closely related to the evolution of property 
prices. Prior to both crises, the perceived risks and delinquency rates of mortgages were low. 
But as the business-cycle turned, risks and delinquencies increased. Does this imply that banks 
should ration credit, prioritizing applicants with a high credit-rating during economic booms to 
avoid increasing the risks apparently inherent to their segment of the lending market?   
Technologies like the securitization taking place abroad and the creation of OMF in 
Norway gave private investors the opportunity to indirectly hold claims to loans they normally 
wouldn’t, for example mortgages. The banks functioned as certifiers, using their information 
about the quality of mortgages turning them into collateral for financial securities. The funds 
acquired from selling such securities financed further lending growth. How can this process 
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affect the banks’ share in financial markets and what happens to the system during an 
economic downturn? 
The Basel Committee has stated that the capital levels in banks, both risk weighted and 
not, have been too low. The new regulation in development suggests that banks should 
exaggerate the actual credit risks during booms to safeguard against a recession. As a 
stabilizing improvement from the Norwegian banking crisis, Norwegian banks kept higher 
capital ratios prior to the financial crisis. What is a responsible level of bank capital and what 
are the implications of high capital requirements for the credit market and the real economy? 
Like I described in chapter 3, the Norwegian government made several efforts to 
improve liquidity in the banking industry during the financial crisis. What are the problems 
associated with illiquidity, how do they relate to solvency problems, and could the banking 
industry take more precautions to avoid illiquidity without adversely affecting profitability? 
Norwegian bankers had become far more experienced with operating in a competitive 
environment prior to the financial crisis, than they were in the wake of financial liberalization 
prior to the Norwegian banking crisis. How do manager’s incentives and experience affect the 
investment risks taken by banks?   
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5 The model 
5.1 The microeconomics of banking  
I will use a simplified view of banks consistent with that applied by the microeconomic models 
presented. When not mentioned otherwise explicitly, a bank will refer to a commercial bank or 
at least that fraction of a universal bank which focuses on traditional banking activities. 
Commercial banks are first and foremost treated as economic intermediaries with two 
important traits: The ability to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans, and the 
ability to cost effectively monitor investments. Further I will use the terms loans, assets and 
investments interchangeably, as opposite to deposits and equity, when referring the assets and 
liabilities sides of the bank’s balance sheet respectively.  
Banks operate differently from normal businesses. Instead of using inputs to maximize 
profits, a bank earns a return or interest on its loans and pays interest on its deposits. The 
profits made thus come from the wedge between these two interest rates times the size of total 
loans and deposits, minus various fixed costs. The bank is also required to keep a share of 
deposits as reserves to avoid illiquidity in face of, for example an unexpectedly high amount of 
deposit withdrawals. Reserve requirements can be kept in the interbank market which pays an 
interest rate, or in the central bank. At any given time, some banks have deficits while others 
have surpluses in excess of their need to meet their daily requirements. In order to keep banks 
liquid, the system necessitates a well functioning market for overnight and same-day settlement 
loans, where banks can quickly collect credit to complete transactions. Traditionally, the 
central bank met this need, but today an even larger amount of transactions occur directly 
between commercial banks, according to Demiralp et al. (2005). All lending activity between 
banks will, for the rest of this thesis, be referred to as lending in the interbank market, as 
opposed to lending to businesses or customers. 
According to Holmström and Tirole (1997) the predictions of their model are broadly 
consistent with what happened during the Scandinavian banking crisis, in terms of the 
interaction between the financial and the real sectors. This view is shared by Allen and Gale 
(1999). It is an incentive model of financial intermediation in which both firms and 
intermediaries are credit constrained. The limited access to credit in the economy as well as the 
possibility of investment monitoring by intermediaries are the two main topics of interest when 
relating the model to the Norwegian banking crisis and the subprime financial crisis. 
Holmström and Tirole (1997), claim that firms are run by entrepreneurs who have limited 
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liability.
13
 Because of this limited liability some firms may intentionally reduce their project’s 
probability of success in order to enjoy a private benefit, that is if proper market incentives are 
absent and their activities are not monitored by an outsider. In the following section I will set 
up the important equations of the model and present some its technically important 
assumptions, as well as its further implications about bank behavior. 
5.2 Assumptions and prerequisites 
There are three types of agents in the model who are all risk neutral; namely firms, 
intermediaries and individual, uninformed investors. There are two points in time. At the first, 
investment decisions are made, and at the second, returns are realized (ibid). Firms have 
varying amounts of initial funds A, or collateral as the authors write, and are distributed along a 
cumulative distribution function G(A). The aggregate amount of firm capital is                   
   ∫      . Each firm has an investment project I costing I > 0. If A < I, then the firm 
will require at least     in additional, external financing in order to undertake the investment 
in period 1. In period 2, the project can generate a verifiable return of R, in case of success, or 
zero, in case of failure. The success probability is denoted by p. The firm further chooses 
between a bad high-risk project with a high private benefit B should it succeed, and a relatively 
safe project with zero private benefit. The respective success probabilities of the two 
investment projects are      and      with the assumption that           .  To 
sum up: 
             {
                                      
                                        
    
            {
                                       
                                          
 
There is limited liability in the sense that a firm can lose only the value of its equity capital A 
in case of failure.  
The opportunity cost of individual direct investment is  , meaning that this is what such 
an investor could earn by placing his funds elsewhere in the financial market. According to 
Tirole (2006)   can be either exogenously given, in which case the savings are completely 
elastic at interest rate      , or endogenously given by a standard upward sloping supply 
                                                          
13
 Limited liability means here, that a borrower only can be held partly financially responsible, should his behavior 
cause him to default on his loan. We assume that all of the borrower’s money has gone into the investment along 
with his loan, and that there is no other way for a bank to punish him directly ex post. 
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function S( ). For simplicity S( ) will only be included in equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) 
in section 5.5. The analysis will treat   as exogenous.  
Only the good project is feasible from an economic view point:  
(1)                      
But due to the limited liability of firms, their managers might still choose the bad project 
because of the private benefit B. We assume that a firm has to spend resources on managing its 
project, or at least has to exert a costly effort in some other way, in order to raise the project’s 
success probability from     to    . This is desirable from an investors perspective, but by 
doing so, the firm will have to renounce B. From the firm’s point of view, the best case 
scenario would be to shirk on the effort and having the project, which is then considered to be 
bad from the lender’s standpoint, succeed anyway. The reduced effort cost by choosing the bad 
project is represented by the private benefit B whenever it is successful. Shirking is possible 
when investors are incapable of monitoring the firm’s activities. Monitoring the firm reduces 
the private benefit from undertaking the bad project from B to b, where      . The reason 
is that as long as certain activities are monitored, it will be impossible for the firm to 
completely avoid making an effort, without getting caught.  Monitoring won’t be able to reveal 
all inefficiencies however, and so the reduced private benefit b is still greater than zero. Even if 
almost all firm behavior were observable, an enforceable contract accounting for all 
foreseeable shortcomings would be too complicated, time consuming, and expensive to design 
in practice. Possibly very vague contractual breaches would also have to be proven to a third 
party. The expenses of attempting to reduce b to zero clearly outweigh the benefits. Monitoring 
a firm’s activities also involves a cost and is only economically feasible for intermediaries in 
the market for indirect finance within this model. The uninformed investors in the economy 
find non-delegated monitoring to be too costly.
 
The reason why banks, mutual funds and other 
such organizations are referred to as financial intermediaries, is because they collect funds 
from uninformed investors and use their expertise and share scale of operations to invest these 
funds efficiently. The economies of scale allow diversification of the investment portfolio. The 
concentration of skill, as well as repeated transactions with clients, enables the intermediary to 
cost effectively monitor investments. Individual investors do not possess the time or resources 
to monitor every investment on their own, and so they delegate this task to an intermediary.  
The combination of asymmetric information in the credit market, limited liability of 
firms, and the cost of monitoring, creates a need for intermediary finance. The following 
sections will, by using the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997), describe firms’ access to 
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direct finance, indirect finance and how the two types can co-exist in a credit market 
equilibrium due to hidden information, in that order. 
5.3 Direct finance 
This section presents a credit market without financial intermediaries. It is nonetheless 
important to include as its insights represent the foundations on which indirect finance can be 
introduced. Let’s say that a firm invests A in its own project and uninformed investors invest    
I – A. Neither interested party is paid if the project fails, but in the event of success the firm 
gets    > 0 and the uninformed investors get    > 0, where        . Since there is no 
private benefit involved for uninformed investors, besides their share of the realized project 
return, they would like the firm to always undertake the project with a high chance of 
success   . If the firm is to choose the good project, the following condition needs to hold: 
(2)                  
In words, the firm’s expected return from being diligent and choosing the good project, must 
be at least as large as the firm’s expected return from choosing the bad project with the added 
private benefit B. This represents the proper market incentives mentioned earlier. A profit 
maximizing firm will always choose the bad project in the absence of monitoring by investors 
if this condition does not hold. We will return to that scenario in section 5.4 about indirect 
finance. Following from equation (2) and the fact that         , we get the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the firm: 14 
(ICC )                                                                
The previous condition, together with          implies that: 
            
The total return generated by a successful good project is  . This will have to be divided 
between the uninformed investor, whose share is    and the firm, getting   . If we assume that 
the firm’s ICC holds,     must be at least equal to       for the firm to accept the investment 
contract and behave diligently. The share of return left for the uninformed investors     must 
                                                          
14
                                                             
 
                                      (ICC )                                        
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be at least as large as their opportunity cost  . A necessary and sufficient condition for firms to 
obtain direct finance is:   
(3)                                                          
To explain (3) the sum to be invested in the firm’s project     must yield an expected return 
at least as high, in absolute terms, as the opportunity cost of investing the money in the market          
       for the uninformed investor. Otherwise, the firm will not be able to attract any capital 
to its investment project. The expected return is just           multiplied by the 
probability of a good project succeeding   . We remember from before that only the good type 
project is economically feasible, and thus the only appealing business endeavor for uninformed 
investors. An interesting point is that the share of firm equity, relative to its project cost    , 
directly affects what return is required for a firm’s investment project to acquire outside 
financing. Firms that are already well capitalized along the cumulative distribution function get 
easier access to outside funds. Capital attracts capital in this model. Drawing on all the above 
assumptions, we can define a minimum requirement for a firm’s equity, for it to qualify for 
direct finance       , where        
(4)                            
 
5.4 Indirect finance 
Firms that fail to meet the capital requirements to qualify for direct finance may have the 
option to turn to a financial intermediary. As described above, investors want firms to deliver 
good projects. Intermediaries have the same preferences, but instead of leaving the firms’ 
selection of projects to the existing market incentives, they can enforce the choice through 
monitoring. A firm that has chosen bad projects in the past might ruin its reputation and lose 
access to future financing, both direct and indirect.
 
This line of reasoning relates to relationship 
banking and involves repeated transactions between lenders and borrowers.
15
 Since the model 
by Holmström and Tirole (1997) is static and only considers two points in time I will not 
discuss this further here.
 
 
The intermediary in turn, gets a portion of its funds from uninformed investors. Hence 
the payoff of the project will be divided into three parts:            where    is the 
intermediary’s share. This suggests that individual investors are worse off by delegating 
investment and monitoring to an intermediary, and thus involving a third party, than by 
                                                          
15
 For a thorough description of relationship banking, see the article by Boot (1999).  
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investing in firms directly. This would also be the case, had it not been for the presence of 
asymmetric information. Intermediaries can exist within the model framework because some 
firms would choose bad projects deliberately in the absence of their monitoring. Investors are 
of course aware of this. One consequence of a credit market without financial intermediaries, 
but with asymmetric information, would therefore be a segment of firms, capable of 
undertaking good, profitable projects when monitored, not getting financed. The widely cited 
paper by Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) notes that informational frictions generally, and 
proprietary and asymmetric information specifically, provide the most fundamental argument 
for the existence of financial intermediaries like banks.   
By monitoring its borrowers, the intermediary can reduce the firm’s private benefit 
from shirking from B to b. By inserting the reduced private benefit into the firm’s incentive 
compatibility constraint, derived in section 5.3 concerning direct finance, we get the ICC for a 
borrowing firm subject to intermediary monitoring: 
         (ICC )                                                
Another assumption required under indirect finance is that        , otherwise the firm 
would behave diligently even in the absence of monitoring.  For unchanged relative success 
probabilities of the good and the bad project, we see that the return needed in order for a firm 
to find outside financing worthwhile has gone down. Monitoring comes at a fixed cost denoted 
c however. For the intermediary to find monitoring economically efficient, the following 
condition has to be satisfied:  
         (ICC )                                                  
This is the incentive compatibility constraint for the intermediary to actively monitor its 
investment. The return on informed investment must be at least as large as the cost of 
monitoring, divided by increased success probability of the project from    to    which 
monitoring ensures. The expected return for uninformed investors, from financing an 
investment through an intermediary, is then given by: 16   
(5)                                 
The expression (5) is simply what is left after both the bank and the firm have gotten their 
revenue shares of       and       respectively. Each of them must earn at least its opportunity 
cost to participate in the venture. The equation also assumes that delegated intermediary 
                                                          
16
    [       ]                                                  . 
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monitoring, forces the firm to choose the economically feasible good project, hence the 
multiplication by    . Uninformed investors still have an opportunity cost of   . If    is the 
capital invested in a project by the intermediary, the expected rate of return on intermediary 
capital is: 
          
Since monitoring is costly,   has to be greater than  . This has the implication that firms prefer 
uninformed capital to intermediary capital. As mentioned earlier, a firm with a solid reputation 
and a significant own capital base can gather funds directly from the financial markets. The 
firms that fail to meet the required standards in terms of reputation and collateral have to turn 
to an intermediary for their capital needs, since uninformed investors find their projects too 
risky due to asymmetric information and limited liability. Some firms might not qualify even 
for indirect finance. This segmentation of the credit market is therefore not an optimal situation 
from the firms’ point of view. In the real world, newcomers face a higher requirement for 
expected profitability than their more well-established counterparts which, through their 
longevity, are considered relatively safe investments in the credit market. The same goes for 
firms that are equity constrained. The intermediary’s share of investment in a project is given 
by: 
                         
Uninformed investors contribute             . A necessary and sufficient condition for 
a firm to be financed is then: 
                            
This can be rewritten as: 
(6)                                               
A firm with less initial assets than        will not get financed by neither uninformed 
investors nor an intermediary.         increases in both   and  , so it gets more difficult to 
obtain financing when either the market rate of return   or the monitoring rate of return   
increases (Holmström and Tirole, 1997). The firms in this model can be divided into three 
categories: highly capitalized firms with        which can fund their projects through direct 
uninformed finance, firms with               that can borrow funds from an 
intermediary, and finally there are the businesses with          that fail to acquire any 
financing at all. Holmström and Tirole (1997) present two different figures to illustrate this 
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segmentation of firms in the credit market and the role of monitoring by intermediaries: Figure 
2 shows the coexistence of uninformed and informed intermediary capital. The uninformed 
investors receive the same return from investing directly and indirectly in equilibrium. 
Otherwise it would be profitable to choose only the option with the highest return on 
investment. 
     Figure 2: Financial intermediation. 
 
                    Source: Holmström and Tirole (1997) 
Figure 3 illustrates a second possibility where uninformed investors can use the monitoring of 
firms, by institutions like banks, as a certification mechanism. The market equilibrium is the 
same whether investors invest in               firms through an intermediary, or 
whether they use the intermediaries’ interest in such firms as a signal to invest directly. This 
last possibility is what is meant by certification and can be related to the rapidly growing 
market for mortgage backed securities prior to the recent financial crisis. What matters to 
investors is that the monitor holds a sufficient stake in its firms (Holmström and Tirole, 1997). 
Later, I will show how securitization can both expand the use of certification and be a source 
for moral hazard. 
                            Figure 3: Certification.  
 
                      Source: Holmström and Tirole (1997) 
 
5.5 Equilibrium in the credit market 
The equilibrium condition for informed capital  , where         denotes the demand for 
informed capital, is:   
(7)               where                                   
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The demand for informed capital is a function of the required expected rates of return on 
uninformed capital   and informed capital          . The demand for informed capital 
decreases in  , since a higher   means that such borrowing becomes relatively more expensive 
for firms. Those firms that barely managed to get access to indirect finance are squeezed out of 
the market. This can be seen directly from equation (8) as an increase in   , increases the 
minimum level of own equity required for firms to qualify for indirect finance       . The 
effect of   on the demand for informed capital is ambiguous, since an increase in this variable, 
increases both         and     , causing both indirect and direct financing to become more 
expensive, but possibly keeping the relative financing costs intact. The outcome depends on the 
distribution function G. The equilibrium condition for uninformed capital, where 
        denotes the demand for uninformed capital, is:       
(8)                  where   
                   ∫  
    
     
                ∫           
 
     
 
The             is the remaining total uncovered project cost of firms qualifying for 
monitored financing only, after subtracting the value of their equity and contribution by 
intermediaries. The firms in this category are distributed according to G in the range        
to     . The whole term ∫  
    
     
                can then be interpreted as the aggregate 
demand for uninformed capital to be allocated to firms through financial intermediaries. This is 
seen more intuitively from Figure 2, where the arrows indicate how monitors finance this 
category of firms both through their own capital and by attracting additional capital from 
uninformed investors. The last term,  ∫           
 
     
, is just the aggregate demand for 
direct finance by firms that don’t need monitoring. The combined demand of these two 
segments of borrowers in the credit market gives the aggregate total demand for uninformed 
capital       . The market for uninformed capital clears when: 
(9)                             . 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) show that for each  , there is a unique    that solves equation (9). 
The aggregate demand for capital, both informed and uninformed is given by: 17 
                                                          
17
 Using (9) with (7) and (8) we get    ∫            
 
     
{∫  
    
     
               }   
{∫           
 
     
} + {                        }  =                 .  
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(10)                      ∫                   
 
     
 
The left-hand side of equation (10) is aggregate demand for credit from firms that are above 
minimum requirement for equity and project return. The right-hand side is the supply of capital 
to these firms. In equilibrium, credit supply equals credit demand. The firms that are 
distributed below        fall outside the market and are not funded.  
5.6 Important results 
The model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) shows how asymmetric information creates a 
genuine need in the market for financial intermediaries capable of monitoring investment 
projects when individual investors are uninformed. It also shows how banks may end up with 
assets that are individually more risky than those found in the market for direct finance, since 
the model expects them to finance firms relatively less well endowed in terms of reputation and 
capital. Such financial fragility and operational opacity will typically characterize small, young 
firms. As an empirical illustration of how firm size matters for their composition of external 
financing, consider, the table below on firms in US manufacturing. Firms are sorted from large 
to small and we clearly see the trend that small firms are prone to hold a much larger 
proportion of short-term bank debt than their large counterparts, 82.9 percent and 22.8 percent 
respectively. The row listing commercial papers’ share of short-term debt shows that, 
predictably, large firms are the ones that first and foremost use emissions and direct financing 
as a source of funding. The share for large firms was 62.8 percent, whereas the share for 
medium sized firms only was 6.9 percent.  
Table 1: 
Source: Kashyap and Stein (1994). 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
From (7) we know that            and from (9) we know that            . Using  
 
(7) and (9) to insert for the demand functions, we get   ∫                   
 
     
. 
Bank and non-bank sources of debt for American manufacturing corporations in 1991 
Outside Financing Total Large Medium Small 
Bank debt/Total debt     
Short-term 44.9% 22.8% 77.0% 82.9% 
Long-term 31.2% 21.1% 51.7% 59.3% 
Total 33.0% 21.3% 54.9% 65.5% 
Commercial paper as 
% of short-term debt 
    N.A 62.8%    6.9%     N.A 
Non-bank short-term 
debt 
    N.A 81.3% 30.1%     N.A 
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Simultaneously, banks must offer a satisfactory rate of return to obtain financing from 
uninformed investors. The combination of risky illiquid assets and the need for constant 
outside funding goes a long way to show how banks can be adversely affected by a credit 
crunch or a capital squeeze and how this in turn spills over to its borrowers. The key variables 
from the model that I will use in the analysis are; the demanded rates of return   and  , the 
success probabilities for firm projects    and   , the lower limits to qualify for informed and 
uninformed capital   and   and the cost of monitoring c. Differences in these values will affect 
the composition of the credit market and a significant downturn in the economy is likely to 
influence all of them to some extent. The next chapter will make use of the insights provided 
by Holmström and Tirole (1997) to explain the various problems banks face when the 
economy turns from boom to bust. When the explanatory powers of the model are lacking, I 
will supplement it by different theories and experiences from the Norwegian banking crisis and 
the financial crisis.   
5.7 Relevance for the Norwegian banking crisis  
Holmström and Tirole (1997) focus on the US for empirical data when exploring the effects of 
a credit crunch, but their insights are relevant for describing the Norwegian banking crisis as 
well. In the US, the change in bank lending that occurred within states during 1990-1991 can to 
a large extent be explained by the 1989 capital-asset ratios of the banking sectors within 
individual states. Such a wide collection of data does not exist for the Norwegian banking 
crisis, since capital requirements for Norwegian banks were determined on a national level. 
When investigating how the banking systems of different states fared as the economy went into 
a recession, the data suggests that capital ratios did affect intermediary credit supply. In the 
Northeast of the country, there was a sharp decline in lending and this was also the area where 
real estate markets experienced the biggest drop. The positive correlation between these two 
phenomena demonstrates how banks are very vulnerable to reduced asset prices. From graphs 1 
and 2 in chapter 2, we recall how the price evolution of Norwegian commercial real estate 
closely followed the development in bank lending. Holmström and Tirole (1997) also find 
evidence of a flight to capital in the credit market during the recession, which fits the models 
predictions that poorly capitalized firms will be squeezed out first in a credit crunch. Bernanke 
et al. (1996) write that borrowers who face considerable agency costs in the credit market are 
expected to be affected the most by an economic downturn. Such borrowers consist of small 
firms, consumers with little own capital or firms with weak balance sheets, all of whom are 
typically dependent on intermediary capital. The phenomenon that banks, when becoming 
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credit constrained, cut off their lending to such clients first is what is meant by a flight to 
quality and is similar to the intensified screening during recessions that I mentioned earlier and 
an increase in  . Borrowers with a relatively large share of own-capital invested in their own 
business ventures are more likely to make an extra effort to reduce the chance of project 
defaults. Firms that already find themselves in a weak position are thus, rather unsurprisingly, 
most adversely struck by fluctuations in the business cycle as their capital share falls below  . 
They are also the first to respond positively as the economy recovers.  
The model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) makes several assumptions about the 
financial market. Firms with a sufficiently high net worth can use direct finance to fund 
investments. Those that don’t qualify for direct finance have to lend from an intermediary 
capable of close monitoring, hence forcing diligent behavior. During the Norwegian banking 
crisis the segment of the property market that experienced the largest drop in prices was that of 
commercial property. Where the preceding credit boom had provided capital constrained firms 
with loans, the following crunch made it much harder for the same type of highly leveraged 
businesses to finance their investment projects. We remember how economic booms allow 
firms and consumers to borrow against the increasing value of their assets, and how these 
borrowers can become increasingly leveraged as asset prices fall. We also know that the 
reserve capital of Norwegian banks was at a low level throughout the lending boom, making 
them quite vulnerable to negative fluctuations in the business cycle. Since defaults are 
relatively less common as long as the economy is growing, the deregulation of the Norwegian 
financial markets caused banks to prioritize business expansion over asset quality. The fact that 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) treat not only firms, but also intermediaries as capital 
constrained in their model, is one important reason why I chose it to describe the Norwegian 
banking crisis as well as the latest financial crisis, as it seems like a crucial assumption for 
understanding bank behavior when the business cycle turns from boom to bust. Both banks and 
firms became overextended following financial deregulation, prior to the Norwegian banking 
crisis.  
5.8 Applicability to the financial crisis 
According to Holmström and Tirole (1997), a strong growth in business loans increases the 
aggregate default risk of a bank’s asset portfolio and results in less intense monitoring of 
investments. In 2006, as it is presented in a report from the Norwegian Financial Supervisory 
Agency, the interest rate margins charged by banks prior to the financial crisis were small 
(Finanstilsynet, 2006). A significant, industry wide increase in the volume of loans and 
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deposits contributed to high earnings for the banking industry. The prevailing, favorable macro 
situation, made loan losses were very manageable and outside debt financing was easily 
available to banks. Since both asset risks and funding liquidity problems were small, the banks 
were able to operate small levels of capital. These general facts about the Norwegian banking 
industry prior to the financial crisis are largely consistent with the theoretical assumptions of 
the model and the experiences prior to the Norwegian banking crisis. It should be mentioned 
that banks investments were generally safer than in the late 1980s, and that bank managers had 
gained much experience from operating in a competitive environment since then. Competition 
however, forces down the market interest rate margins, causing banks to increase the volume of 
loans and deposits relative to capital to maximize profits. While the general economy was 
doing well and few loans defaulted, it was difficult for regulators following Basel II to 
efficiently reduce the potential future riskiness of the banks’ portfolios through counter-
cyclical measures and capital requirements were kept at a low level.   
An overextended banking system can quickly become very illiquid when exogenous 
shocks cause an economic recession. When asset prices deteriorate, the resulting credit crunch 
can affect the whole economy as small businesses dependent upon intermediary capital are 
getting squeezed, unable to find other sources of funding for their projects. Like I mentioned in 
chapter 3, these problems were much smaller for Norwegian banks than for example for US 
banks, and also significantly smaller than during the previous crisis. Illiquidity however, did 
become a serious problem as the credit market dried up. 
As the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) predicts, as the economy was recovering 
from the recent financial crisis and banks were experiencing difficulties with renewing outside 
financing, they were forced to reduce their own lending to firms. The crisis also affected the 
profitability of borrowing firms, squeezing their capital and thus making them more risky from 
the banks’ point of view. Due to the credit crunch and capital squeeze banks became reluctant 
to lend both to more risky businesses as well as to each other, easily seen by the prevailing 
high rate of interest on interbank loans after the financial crisis struck.  
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6 Analysis   
 
6.1 The fragility of banking 
The fragility of banking provides a basic theoretical starting point for describing the relation 
between the Norwegian banking crisis and the recent financial crisis. Before discussing the 
model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) directly in relation to more specific topics, I would 
therefore like to dedicate a paragraph to this fundamental basis for understanding how the 
banking industry is exposed to risk and fluctuations in the business cycle.  
When market conditions are favorable and few loans default, banks would want to keep 
as small capital reserves as possible, relative to the size of their balance sheets. Any unused 
capital is a restriction on the investment strategy. The essence of profitable banking is to collect 
as much capital as possible through deposits and then to invest the money as efficiently as 
possible through lending, while keeping the interest-rate spread high. The fragility of banking 
comes from the fact that deposits are considered very liquid while loans are quite illiquid. If the 
percentage of deposits kept as reserves is small, the bank may have to terminate investments 
prematurely to pay off depositors, in the event that some of them may want to withdraw a 
considerable amount of money for some reason, rational or arbitrary. A bank run, being a 
rather extreme manifestation of this scenario, can be based on either; rational expectations 
about a bank’s insolvency or less fortunately, on self fulfilling speculation. The bank is likely 
to lose money by selling off investment projects prematurely, often at what is called fire sale 
prices. If the total resale value of loans is less than the required price of compensating 
depositors, the bank is insolvent and goes bankrupt. Although bank runs happen very rarely 
nowadays, it may still be the case that the deterioration of a bank’s assets leaves it momentarily 
illiquid and in urgent need of means to complete market transactions. Capital reserves work as 
a buffer against illiquidity and finally insolvency if many loans should default, or in the less 
common event of an arbitrary bank run. To summarize, capital requirements force banks to 
choose sub-optimal investment strategies in a boom, but may secure them against insolvency in 
a recession. As in the example of credit rationing, the important trade off is low risk and 
stability versus the possibility of high profits.  
There are two ways a bank can increase its profits within the simple framework 
presented in the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997), when treating the fixed costs as 
exogenous. It can either increase the difference between interest rates on loans and deposits, or 
it can gear up its balance sheet, that is increase the amount of loans and deposits relative to the 
size of its own capital. Since the banking sector is assumed to be competitive in the model, the 
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interest rates are also exogenously determined in the market for credit supply and demand. This 
leaves only the latter option, which leads us to an important point, the fragility of banking. If a 
competitive bank faces no regulation, it will want to reduce its reserve capital to zero. This is 
money that cannot be invested in the market for bank loans and therefore forces the bank to 
choose a less than optimal level of market exposure. The reserve capital has an important 
function however. Whereas bank deposits are very liquid and can be withdrawn at almost any 
time, loans are usually long-term and quite illiquid, which is an intrinsic risk factor in the 
banking system. The capital reserves create a buffer of liquidity beyond what can be lent in the 
interbank market, should a bank be in a liquidity crisis, for example due to many unexpected 
simultaneous withdrawals or a decline in loan repayments. Basically, the share of a bank’s 
capital that is not invested in illiquid assets diminishes earnings when the bank is doing well, 
but works as a safety net during bad times. When a recession puts the whole banking system 
under strain due to reduced returns on assets, the ability to still pay off depositors preserves the 
individual banks reputation for being safe. In rather extreme cases, the rumor of a bank being 
illiquid can cause a panic among its depositors, eventually resulting in a bank run. This, 
famously, happened to Northern Rock during the recent financial crisis.
 18
 The desire for banks 
to minimize capital buffers to enhance efficiency is an important part of the model, when using 
it to illustrate how the banking system is affected by a recession. As Holmström and Tirole 
(1997) write, the Scandinavian recession, including the Norwegian banking crisis, arguably 
started as a credit crunch, since banks were overextended and had to reduce their lending. 
When the aggregate share of capital in the banking industry is low, interbank credit is quickly 
depleted, so there is a relatively high risk of individual bank illiquidity becoming systemic.  
6.2 The availability of credit and consequences for small firms 
A proposition made by Holmström and Tirole (1997) is that a reduction in the supply of 
capital, due to some macroeconomic shock, reduces aggregate investment and increases the 
lower limit on equity capital required for a firm to qualify for indirect financing,       . The 
result is that poorly capitalized firms are the first to lose their financing during a capital 
squeeze or a credit crunch. A firm with a strong capital base can always do as well as a firm 
with fewer internal funds as long as a reduction in firm or intermediary capital is not offset by 
an increase in uninformed capital. The possibility that uninformed investors would step in to 
save a firm that has just lost its informed financing, hence gaining a less favorable reputation, 
seems unlikely. This insight has important implications for allowing financial intermediaries to 
                                                          
18
 For a detailed description of that particular incident, see Shin (2009). 
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be poorly capitalized during booms, since it increases the volatility of credit availability in the 
economy. 
 During the recent financial crisis, bank lending both to firms and in the interbank 
market dried up. Banks that operated on small capital buffers were severely affected by the 
credit crunch. In a recession it can be assumed that the rates of return on investment projects R, 
as well as the probability of success for a good project   , are going to decrease. The reduced 
success probability implies increased asset risk for the lending party. Following the logic of 
Holmström and Tirole (1997), a reduction in these two variables causes        to increase, 
meaning that borrowers require higher levels of equity capital and expected project profitability 
to qualify for any sort of outside financing. Capital poor firms are necessarily bound to be 
squeezed out of the market first. Since the model predicts that small, young and opaque firms 
are the ones most adversely affected by a credit crunch, a pro-cyclical bank lending pattern will 
contribute to make the operation of such businesses more uncertain. Relative to their larger, 
more well-established counterparts, a higher share of small scale firms might therefore also go 
bankrupt during a recession, since their financial situation is in danger of being weakened from 
two sides. Firstly, like most firms in a recession they are faced with a reduced demand for their 
products and services, but second and maybe equally important, is the possibility that their 
access to outside lending might be cut off as well.  
Although stock prices also fall during a recession eroding the capital of firms using 
direct financing, this implies that the opportunity cost of direct investment   has decreased. As 
long as the performance of an individual stock coincides with the market index, investors are 
not more likely to sell the stock of any particular firm unless. A serious firm specific capital 
flight generally requires sub-par performance or widespread speculation about future 
bankruptcy. The effects of a recession on a directly financed firm with a solid reputation will 
therefore be less dramatic than for a small and opaque firm since its funding, although 
diminished, is unlikely to be cut off completely. The ability to diversify financing sources is 
important for operational stability. Small firms are interestingly also the first to recover when 
the recession ends, but only if they don’t go out of business first. Bankruptcies represent a real 
irreversible cost to the economy and the real value of stability in the banking system and the 
credit market therefore becomes evident. Pro-cyclical banking is economically inefficient for 
society in the long run, since it causes the share of small-firm bankruptcies to increase during a 
recession. The economic costs incurred by allowing a highly leveraged banking industry 
therefore outweigh the gains from increased profits during booms, due to bankruptcies. 
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Holmström and Tirole (1997) fail to mention the social cost of bankruptcies when explaining 
the squeezing of firms. Neither do they include the possibility of bank failures in their model.  
6.3 Bank failures 
The failure of large financial intermediaries like Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and AIG were 
a crucial part of the US experience during the financial crisis and the situation would have been 
much worse had the government not intervened by injecting new funds. From chapter 2 we 
also remember how the stocks of major Norwegian banks were written down to zero during the 
Norwegian banking crisis.  
An externality arising from bank failures is that the clients of a failed bank are 
disconnected from future funding. Borrowers of quality               often depend on 
financing from a single bank. Although they have the opportunity to move their custom to a 
surviving bank, this bank will have less direct information about them. The banking industry is 
characterized by long-term customer relationships during which time valuable information is 
gathered through monitoring and repeated transactions. When an intermediary is liquidated, 
valuable private information about its borrowers is likely to be lost. In a stressed market 
situation, when major bank failures usually occur, the terms of replacing a credit-supply 
arrangement for disconnected firms are likely to be particularly tough, since asset risks are 
perceived to be high and banks are reluctant to accept new and potentially risky customers 
(Brunnermeier et al, 2009). Holmström and Tirole’s (1997) theory predicts that banks with 
liquidity problems are eager to obtain safe investments, and might want to steer away from 
small and opaque investment projects. This assumption is backed up by Norwegian banks’ 
reaction to the recent credit crunch as they reined in on their lending to new customers (Norges 
Bank, 2009).  
Within the framework of the model, a bank becoming insolvent can be seen as an 
extreme case of a credit crunch for its borrowers. The interesting difference from an aggregate 
credit crunch without bank failures is that not only will firms with an equity capital slightly 
above        temporarily loose their access to intermediary finance. In addition, a whole 
range of borrowers, in terms of quality, will enter the market competing for access to a new 
source of funding. Due to lost private information, the market for intermediary finance will fail 
to absorb all economically efficient investment projects, when firms seek a credit source 
replacement in the wake of a bank failure. A further analysis of whether the level of own 
capital that under normal market conditions would provide a firm with intermediary finance is 
still sufficient after a bank failure, could be an interesting addition to Holmström and Tirole’s 
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(1997) model. At least we know that the Norwegian government has bailed out important 
banks in the past and is likely to do so in the future, exactly because of the distresses associated 
with a large bank failure, not to mention the risk of contagion.    
6.4 Liquidity 
When a bank experiences liquidity problems, the market will usually start to speculate about its 
underlying solvency as well, despite efforts made by the bank to deny this. An illiquid bank 
that has yet to fail, will often be required to sell off assets at fire-sale prices in order to rid itself 
of the illiquidity problems. A consequence of such fire sales is that the market prices of similar 
asset will be driven down when these are valued on a mark-to-market basis (Brunnermeier et 
al, 2009).  
Mark-to-market valuation is used to measure the current price of an asset.
19
 The price is 
often based on the market’s valuation of similar assets. An example showing the usefulness of 
mark-to-market valuation is the sale of an apartment in which the seller has lived for, say ten 
years. Prior to such a sale it will be important to determine the present value of the apartment 
as its old nominal price is outdated and inaccurate. A natural starting point would be to base its 
value on the recent going prices of other apartments of similar quality (size, location etc.). If 
housing prices are generally low at the time due to an unfavorable market situation, this is 
likely to be bad news for the seller. If he still has a mortgage, the reduced asset price means 
that his capital share has decreased. Similarly, a major fire sale is likely to hurt the financial 
situation of other banks since it causes the value of their assets to be reduced, forcing them to 
sell assets of their own to improve their liquidity situation and capital ratios. During the recent 
financial crisis, the mark-to-market values of banks’ assets did not only fall, but were also in 
many cases difficult to determine, resulting in increased speculation and perceived asset risks.  
When there is a widespread liquidity problem in the banking industry, attempts at alleviation 
may thus create solvency problems, even if there initially were none. Solvency and liquidity 
are not exogenous to one another (ibid). When problems in the banking system are systemic, 
the result of illiquidity and fire sales can be a downward spiral capable of causing solvency 
problems for banks and other financial intermediaries as their balance sheets are negatively 
affected. Fire sales devalue assets, which causes more illiquidity and further fire sales (ibid).      
To safeguard banks against liquidity problems, they are imposed to keep reserve 
requirements, but such an arrangement does not come without certain unfortunate 
consequences relating to asset risk. If reserve requirements are to increase, this means that the 
                                                          
19
 Definition of Mark-to-market (MTM) from: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marktomarket.asp 
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invested share of funding provided to intermediaries decreases. In the model, all depositors are 
investors who demand a return of at least their opportunity cost   and the model therefore 
predicts that for all other things equal, the return on the remaining intermediary investments 
would have to increase on average to satisfy investors. Drawing on the basic correlation 
between return and risk in finance, this means that a bank with a high reserve requirement 
would have to increase its asset risks to compete for private investment (Lintner, 1965). Prior 
to the financial crisis, US banks boosted their profits through securitization and gearing 
technologies. This is an interesting notion since reserve requirements of banks are kept to 
compensate for risk of illiquidity, while market incentives might cause them to have the 
opposite effect. To prevent banks from having a too risky asset portfolio as a compensation for 
reserve requirements, capital requirements tied to asset risk are also needed.  
6.5 Credit rationing and capital requirements 
I started chapter 2 by writing about how the Norwegian banking industry was subject to a 
government forced rationing of credit prior to the financial deregulation of the mid 80s. 
Consequently the banking industry faced very little risk during that time and fluctuations in 
credit supply were small. As a result, capital requirements were low, according to Steigum 
(2004), which in itself is efficient from a banks point of view. If the banks can successfully 
screen customers, then they will capture the best ones.  
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), an equilibrium with credit rationing in the 
market for bank loans means each bank will hold a less risky loan portfolio than in an 
equilibrium without credit rationing. The argument is as follows: Suppose that the total 
demand for bank credit in the economy consists of individual agents with different risk profiles 
for their investment projects. If a bank were to lend money to just one borrower, it would 
naturally choose the agent with the least risky project (i.e. the smallest chance of default) 
willing to accept the offer at a given rate of interest. Hence, by providing credit to this 
particular agent, the bank would be maximizing its expected profits. As the bank lends money 
to more borrowers of a gradually declining quality, the risk of default for each new loan 
increases and the bank would have to be compensated through a higher interest rate. Let’s say, 
for simplicity, that the bank has to offer the same rate of interest to all its clients. An increase 
in the offered rate means that some low-risk clients might decline a loan, hence increasing the 
level of default risk for the remaining pool of borrowers. The preferred rate is therefore the one 
that for a further marginal increase would cause the bank’s expected profits to decrease due to 
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increased default risk. The result could be an equilibrium with credit rationing, even without 
demand for credit being naturally in excess (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
During both the Norwegian banking crisis and the financial crisis, capital constrained 
banks reined in on their lending, to avoid further exposure to mounting market risks. As an 
alternative to using fire sales, banks under stress can ration credit via higher interest rates or 
margins/ haircuts to regain liquidity and improve capital ratios. Such deleveraging implies a 
cost to the banks’ borrowers (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). Haircuts increased during the financial 
crisis and rather dramatically for some assets. For ABSs, haircuts went from 3-5 percent in 
April 2007 to 50-60 percent in August 2008 (IMF, 2008). As borrowers become credit 
constrained or face tougher terms on their loans, their default risks increase. The increased 
default risks mean that the bank’s assets have become more risky, causing banks to further rein 
in on their lending. It is, in other words, possible to enter a self-amplifying spiral where credit 
restrictions tighten and the economy is weakened, both developments feeding back into one 
another (ibid.)   
In the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) credit rationing, forced or not, creates a 
barrier to private enterprise, artificially driving up   and is therefore not an efficient 
arrangement. Rationing can either be done by reducing the size of a bank’s lending operation 
or by making borrowing prohibitively expensive through increased interest rates, equivalent of 
increasing  . Either way, the number of successfully financed projects will be reduced. 
Uninformed investors are unwilling to replace bank lending due to asymmetric information.  
Allowing high credit levels during booms cause strong fluctuations in credit supply, 
amplifying the oscillation of the business cycle. Arguably, these fluctuations constitute a larger 
cost to the economy than having a suboptimal level of credit during booms in order to achieve 
overall stability in credit levels and hence, the business cycle. This is generally a result of 
marginally positive, but diminishing returns to a credit expansion. Negative deviations from 
trend credit supply has a larger impact on the economy than positive deviations of similar 
magnitude. Perhaps more importantly a volatile credit supply increases bankruptcy risks for 
firms and other financial intermediaries during recessions. A solution would therefore be one 
of self-imposed credit rationing. By this, I mean a system where banks account for the true 
risks of lending irrespective of the prevailing market situation and are able to successfully sort 
the good risks from the bad when the economy is booming, as opposed to a regulated ceiling 
on credit expansion. Such a system of prudence would imply that a segment of firms that get 
loans under the current system, during a favorable market situation would lose their access to 
credit. On the upside, prudent lending would contribute to limiting loan losses for banks and 
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the extent of a credit crunch during a recession, when stressed banks ration through increased 
margins and interest rates.  
The Basel Committee took a step in the right direction in this respect, when it is 
suggested that banks should treat asset risks during booms as if the market was growing at an 
average pace. Such regulation would reduce the impact of bubbles and subsequent corrections 
on credit supply. The inspiration for this suggestion came from the Spanish banking system 
where capital buffers had been successfully built up prior to the financial crisis (Norges Bank, 
2009). The main goal of capital buffers is to induce counter-cyclical behavior that contributes 
to making banks and credit supply less responsive to fluctuations in market risk. Some 
additional firms will, like I mentioned be denied bank financing during booms, so for such an 
arrangement to be as efficient as possible, i.e. allocating credit to the best borrowers, banks will 
have to invest sufficiently in monitoring and screening technologies. 
6.6 Banks’ approach to monitoring 
Compared to venture capitalists, commercial banks do not monitor their projects as intensively. 
Venture capitalists spend far more time and effort overseeing the project management’s 
activities. Since they are more deeply involved than banks in controlling the outcomes of the 
projects they finance, they also hold a much larger stake in them (Holmström and Tirole, 
1997). Banks on the other hand are able to extensively leverage their capital, partly because of 
their comparably lower cost of monitoring. There is a trade off in the sense that, an 
intensification of project monitoring to enhance the individual project’s probability of success, 
means that there will be fewer resources available to spend on other investments, hence 
diminishing profits stemming from gearing and diversification. During economic booms, 
default risks are low (   and    increase) and rigorous monitoring is less profitable and might 
be scaled down. An example is how Norwegian banks went from on-site inspections to 
document based monitoring prior to the Norwegian banking crisis (Vale, 2004).  
 In the model, bank monitoring is only represented by a fixed cost c that does not 
depend on the size or complexity of the investment project being monitored. This feature 
grants obvious returns to scale from monitoring when the intermediary chooses an investment 
project and only contributes further to the squeezing of small firms, particularly during a 
recession. When experiencing a credit crunch, banks will be extra careful in their selection of 
loan applicants and Holmström and Tirole (1997) write that in this situation banks make an 
extra effort sorting out the good risks from the bad. Conversely, c is likely to be reduced during 
a boom, since the risk of failure for both good and bad firm projects are expected to be small 
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and it might be difficult separating the two without sufficient monitoring (i.e. it will be easier 
for a firm with a bad project to successfully present itself as a firm with a good project). The 
consequence of increasing c within the model framework is that intermediary financing 
becomes relatively more expensive, requiring a higher return to break even,          
increases. This means that the share of intermediary finance in the economy is reduced relative 
to the share of direct finance. If monitoring intensity increases, ceteris paribus increasing c, we 
can also assume that the private benefit from shirking b, decreases and so the effect on 
                is ambiguous. From empirical experience an intensification of 
monitoring is likely to make credit supply less volatile in response to fluctuations in the 
business cycle. Dampening an expansion of credit during booms and limiting a contraction 
during recession as long as intermediary finance is replaced by direct finance. Since the 
opportunity cost of investors is exogenously given, the model predicts that this is unlikely to 
happen.  
The model of Holmström and Tirole (1997) also predicts that, as informed capital gets 
scarcer, i.e. less well capitalized financial intermediaries, the result is a shift towards less 
intense monitoring, and vice versa. So even though banks screen loan applicants more 
thoroughly during a credit crunch in an attempt to capture the best clients, the tendency is to 
spend less money on monitoring once a loan is granted. The only basis for efficient screening 
in the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) is the level of own capital in firms. If screening 
cost were included with the monitoring cost c it is less intuitive how a bank’s total 
expenditures to such activities are affected by market conditions. It is also possible to imagine 
that the economy can end up in one of two separate equilibria, one with intensive monitoring 
and another with lax monitoring, depending on the number of firms in the financial markets 
profiting from such activity.        
6.7 Model shortcomings 
The model describes both intermediaries and firms as credit constrained, but does not go into 
any dept when describing intermediary financing options. Intermediaries are assumed to only 
possess a share of the capital necessary to finance projects and collect the rest from uninformed 
investors. There is no distinction between depositors, debtholders and shareholders, and as a 
result banks are not subject to any capital requirements. Based on the presentations of the two 
crises in chapter 2 and chapter 3, well designed capital requirements can play an instrumental 
part in reducing credit fluctuations. Strong capitalization of an intermediary will reduce the 
upward pressure for return on investment   by investors, since debt financing constitutes a 
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smaller share of the banks funding. A bank with a high capital ratio will ceteris paribus be able 
to focus on a less risky, relatively long term investment strategy compared to its highly 
leveraged competitors.  
Furthermore, funding liquidity risk stems from the maturity mismatch between assets 
and liabilities (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). By acquiring a large share of long term funding, a 
bank improves its ability to provide a stable supply of credit to its borrowers by reducing the 
maturity mismatch. During the financial crisis, Norwegian banks, despite holding relatively 
safe assets, experienced liquidity problems as they had to refinance short-term debt under 
difficult circumstances, the consequence of which was reduced lending activity. By simplifying 
intermediary funding in the model, an important source of financial instability in a credit 
crunch is lost. The likely result is an underestimation of the impact that a credit crunch can 
have on the system.  
Holmström and Tirole (1997) further claim that their model makes an argument for pro-
cyclical capital-adequacy ratios in a recession. Market incentives would make it desirable for 
intermediaries to reduce their capital during recession due to higher interest rates. The 
introduction of regulated capital adequacy ratios changes this conclusion. Basel I had been in 
place for some years by 1997 and it seems only reasonable to include its importance on the 
model’s conclusions regarding intermediary capital level evolutions. What the banks are 
allowed to do within this framework is to reduce their capital buffers, while capital adequacy 
ratios may in fact increase. If buffers are already low when recession strikes, regulation may 
require banks to increase their capital during a recession. We know that intermediary credit 
supply    increases in  . The success probabilities of firms’ projects    and    can be 
expected to increase during booms, causing asset risks to decrease and                to 
increase.  Since capital regulations tie capital adequacy ratios to asset risks, intermediaries have 
the freedom to invest more in this situation when capital requirements are low. At a time when 
asset risks are low, banks have the incentive to reduce their buffers as well, knowing that they 
can legally operate on their minimum requirement while increasing their profits as much as 
possible through leveraging. The lending growth prior to the two crises in question was largely 
financed by short-term debt and banks were operating on a low share of easily down-writable 
capital. As boom turned to bust, the perceived asset risks increased, interpreted in the model as 
a decrease in    and   . Capital regulations then impose banks to increase their capital ratios to 
compensate for the increased asset risks, instead of reducing them in response to increased 
interest rates. Although Holmström and Tirole (1997) look at an unregulated market which is 
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interesting in itself, the inclusion of a simplified version of capital regulations would benefit 
their model when using it to describe a financial crisis. 
Another problem originates from the model’s treatment of asset risks itself. As opposed 
to a relatively small independent investor a bank has the necessary amount of capital to 
diversify its portfolio of assets. If its investments are only weakly correlated, then we know 
from basic financial theory that the total risk of the portfolio is reduced by diminishing the 
idiosyncratic risk component. Lintner (1965) writes that the appropriate measure of risk for an 
individual asset within a portfolio of risky assets is not only provided by its return-variance, 
but also its covariance with the other securities in the portfolio. Holmström and Tirole (1997) 
make the somewhat extreme assumption of perfect correlation in financial markets, hence 
removing the benefits of diversification. This somewhat diminishes the economies of scale 
available to a large financial institution. The assumption becomes somewhat less problematic 
when describing a recession. While perfect correlation is particularly unrealistic under normal 
market conditions, the two crises discussed in this thesis were preceded by exogenous shocks 
to the economy causing the prices of weakly correlated assets to deteriorate simultaneously, 
making the impact of the simplifying assumption less severe. A good example is the way 
mortgages from different American states were pooled together as collateral for financial 
securities prior to the subprime crisis, in an attempt to diversify away the delinquency risk and 
default risk of each individual mortgage. Even though this obviously provided security against 
fluctuations in local markets, it failed to withstand a widespread downturn in the national 
housing market. Treating assets as perfectly correlated is still unrealistic since some asset 
prices always shift more than others, but less so when an entire market or even the economy as 
a whole starts slowing down. 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) fail to mention the self-amplifying processes caused by 
deleveraging that can affect the banking industry during a recession. I mentioned in sections 
6.4 and 6.5 how downward spirals are caused by both bank’s credit rationing through increased 
margins and interest rates and banks trying to alleviate liquidity problems through asset sales. 
This is an important criticism of their model since the possibility of such downward spirals 
increases the severity of both a credit crunch and a capital squeeze, which the authors expect to 
occur during a recession like the Norwegian Banking crisis. Nonetheless, banks will have to 
deleverage during a recession to reduce asset risks. If they do not, they are likely to be 
punished by the stock market and investors. Solidity is an important prerequisite for a bank to 
obtain outside financing and the decision to deleverage is thus rational from the individual 
bank’s point of view, even if it is harmful to the system as a whole (Brunnermeier et al, 2009).  
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When using the model to describe a crisis, a nice addition would be some mention of 
the mortgage market. Banks are the primary lending institutions for mortgages, and as was 
seen from both, the Norwegian banking crisis and the financial crisis, the economic downturns 
were closely tied to bubbles in property markets. This could easily be included, since one of 
the main factors determining whether a mortgage is granted or not, is the borrower’s own 
capital. During the strong growth in property prices prior to both crises,         went down, 
causing in some cases unqualified applicants to get a mortgage. This is not so much a criticism 
of the model’s general conclusions, but merely an argument for the role being played by 
property prices in relation to both crises, as opposed to risky projects, deserving to be 
highlighted.  
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7 Theoretical extensions 
7.1 Securitization 
We remember from section 6.1how a bank that is short of liquid assets, may have to satisfy 
depositors’ demand by liquidating investments before their full return is realized at low prices, 
also known as fire sale prices. If instead the bank could negotiate an asset price with an 
interested third party in advance, illiquidity would not entail the loss associated with premature 
liquidation. Securitization allows a bank to do exactly that. In addition to dealing with the 
liquidity risk inherent in the banking system, securitization also allows banks to pass the 
default risk of a loan on to a third party through an SPV Banks have the opportunity to monitor 
their assets closely and can therefore obtain relatively more information about their true value 
and risk than international investors at efficient cost. In other words, there exists an 
information advantage to be exploited. Since the size of the capital requirements depends on 
the risk profile of the bank’s loan portfolio, securitization allowed banks to gear up their 
balance sheets, increasing the volume of loans and deposits relative to their own capital. 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) write that it is very problematic for an international 
investor, being geographically removed and thus possessing limited local knowledge, to hold a 
home mortgage loan directly. A mortgage loan requires servicing and is characterized by being 
of an uncertain credit quality, as well as having a higher propensity to default than an arm’s-
length conservative investor feels comfortable with. Securitization was able to alleviate some 
of these concerns. If mortgages from different areas were packaged together, diversification 
would reduce the risk. Under normal market conditions the individual mortgage qualities 
would only be weakly correlated. If the national economy is not hit by a macroeconomic 
shock, then a borrower defaulting on his mortgage in Los Angeles should not affect the default 
risk a mortgage located in New York, or the overall risk of a well diversified portfolio of 
mortgages for that matter. Individual risks can be diversified away, whereas systematic risks 
affecting the whole housing market is something investors cannot get rid of.
20
 In a seemingly 
healthy, growing economy this was a seemingly small concern however. Furthermore, the 
securities derived from a package of mortgages were organized into different risk categories 
with matching ratings the way I described above. The riskiest claims against the package could 
be sold to those with the capacity to evaluate them and an appetite for risk, while the safest 
AAA-rated claims could be held by international investors. In fact, because of the high demand 
from international investors for AAA-rated products, securitization became focused on creating 
                                                          
20
 For a financial theory regarding portfolio optimization, diversification and systematic risk, see Lintner (1965) 
for an accessible explanation.   
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as much AAA paper from an underlying package of mortgages as possible. Ironically, one type 
of financial institution with a penchant for evaluating mortgages is a bank. Hence, because of 
this and their relatively new born venture into investment banking activities, banks ended up 
holding many of the riskiest, and ultimately worst, claims themselves.  
Holding AAA paper is no guarantee against systemic risk, despite the existence of 
capital adequacy ratios tied to a bank’s asset risks under Basel I and II. Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009) argue that a similar drop in the rating of a bank’s assets will have larger consequences 
for a bank initially holding primarily AAA securities, than one which holds BBB securities if 
both banks operate with an equal capital buffer above their respective capital adequacy 
requirements. In other words, marginal changes in ratings and risk is what matters. The authors 
give three reasons for this. First, AAA assets are systemic to a larger extent because they are 
the most likely to lose value in an unexpected system-wide crisis. Prior to the recent financial 
crisis, we remember how the division of CDOs into tranches allowed large quantities of AAA 
mortgage-backed securities to be issued. Since these were ultimately linked to the housing 
market, the senior tranches were considered safe while housing prices were increasing on 
aggregate, but their ratings were reduced simultaneously as the bubble burst and the equity and 
mezzanine tranches originally designed to carry the idiosyncratic risks became insufficient 
buffers against losses. BBB assets, on the other hand, incorporate idiosyncratic risk and the 
market expects them to be less safe, recession or not, and so possible value losses are 
accounted for through relatively high capital requirements for the owner of such assets also 
during booms. Second, the reduction in market-to-mark value can be greater for AAA paper in 
a recession and finally, the pressure for increases in capital requirements as asset ratings drop 
will be greater for a bank holding AAA assets. This is because the marginal capital adequacy 
ratio is positive, but diminishing in asset risk (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). 
7.2 Certification  
To include securitization into the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) directly is difficult, 
but, we remember from section 5.4 how it accounts for the fact that uninformed investors will 
eventually also take an interest in firms funded by intermediary capital. When such a firm has 
shown that it is capable of maintaining a business relationship with an intermediary, carefully 
monitoring its projects, it sends a positive signal to uninformed investors. A financial 
intermediary has then become a certifier for its assets. Unless they expect the company’s 
behavior to change radically once the composition of its funding changes, they may find it 
worthwhile to contribute with uninformed capital. In an article from 1991 Diamond finds 
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exactly this. If moral hazard is widespread among borrowers in the credit market, then new 
firms have to earn a reputation for being responsible before they gain access to direct financing 
options. This can be achieved by initially submitting themselves to monitoring by an 
intermediary. As a firm gains a favorable track record from repeatedly choosing good projects 
its credit rating will eventually increase. Such signaling reduces the problems associated with 
adverse selection for uninformed investors. Intermediaries such as traditional banks, with cost 
efficient monitoring capabilities can, in other words, pave the way for less risky uninformed 
direct investment in terms of the signal it sends to the financial markets, by continuing the 
relationship with a borrower or not.  
The perpetually existing pool of borrowers that are dependent on intermediary finance 
consists of firms with a mediocre credit rating. The rating is too low for reputation effects to 
eliminate moral hazard alone, but is high enough, so that the moral hazard can be eliminated 
through efficient monitoring. In other words, only intermediaries capable of monitoring will 
invest in such relatively high-risk, low-rated firms. Holmström and Tirole (1997) touch on this 
point in their article, but since their model itself is static, it cannot incorporate the reputational 
effects achieved through repeated transactions in its mathematical setup.  
When banks originate secured loans and provide loan guarantees, and this ability 
increases the importance of diligent bank monitoring in relation to the recent financial crisis. 
For this system to work however, it requires that intermediaries are actually efficiently 
monitoring all of its investments, something an outsider won’t necessarily be able to verify. 
The monitors will also require monitoring. Banks may sacrifice diligent monitoring for other 
priorities, for example branch expansion and competition for market shares, as was the case in 
the build up to the Norwegian banking crisis. In that case, a firm’s ability to maintain a credit 
line to its bank may not send a truthful signal to the financial markets about the quality of the 
firm’s investments. Hiding irresponsible behavior from a lender would typically be easier 
during an economic boom, when fewer investments lose money even if the risks taken are 
generally too high. A firm concerned with satisfying shareholders might take on too high risks 
during a period of economic growth in order to get high earnings short-term, postponing the 
losses until the macro situation deteriorates.  
When interpreting certification as securitization or the issuance of OMF. There are two 
important differences between the two however. By using a pool of mortgages as collateral for 
rated financial securities, the bank sends a signal to investors about the quality of the 
underlying assets, making it possible for them to hold a stake in the asset pool normally 
reserved for intermediary investment within the model framework. 
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For OMF the risks remain on the bank’s balance sheets, meaning that banks still account for 
asset risk in a responsible fashion. Issuing OMF has no direct effect on the importance of the 
success probabilities    and   , so that the banks don’t get the incentive to increase asset risks. 
For products like CDO’s there is a risk of moral hazard. This process would likely reduce the 
effect of    and    on the issuing bank’s investment decision. When the bank sells the claim to 
its assets to an SPV, it no longer holds an actual stake in the asset pool. There is no risk sharing 
and the value from originator certification may therefore be lost. This is especially true if the 
securities were valued at their time of origination, but their values are expected to have 
changed significantly since then.  
Another implication of the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) is that an extra 
dollar of informed capital is assumed to allow firms to increase their leverage. Securitization 
allowing increased leverage in banks therefore causes increased leverage in its borrowing firms 
as well. The whole economy faces the risk of becoming overextended and credit will be 
abundant during booms and even scarcer than necessary during recessions, causing additional 
volatility in the business-cycle. The authors refer to this trend as a possible looser banking 
norm in recessions. The Norwegian banking system was responsible in this respect, avoiding 
the type of securitization seen in US markets.  
7.3 Managers’ incentives 
Although there is no management included in the model by Holmström and Tirole (1997), the 
banks are modeled so that they invest a share of their own capital into assets as opposed to just 
channeling outside uninformed investment. Banks are therefore stakeholders in their assets, 
which can provide them (at least partially) with the proper incentives to avoid excessive risk 
taking. In reality, bank managers have to answer to shareholders and investors interested in 
maximizing return and whose preferences may therefore not always be in the best interest of 
their bank in terms of long-term solvency. Within the model framework, we could imagine a 
high   during economic booms, placing pressure on banks to increase the returns on their 
assets. Several incentive models simplify this problem by assuming that the manager is also a 
shareholder. The motivation for a manager to keep his job and the included benefits for an 
extended period of time, as well as maintaining a reputation for being responsible, may counter 
the priorities as a shareholder.  
This conflict of interest moves the discussion into the theoretical territory of corporate 
governance. Byrd et al. (1998) note that stockholders only have limited influence over the 
company in which they own shares, despite the fact that they have capital at risk. They 
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perceive corporations as investment vehicles and want managers to maximize their equity for 
them, by working diligently and efficiently. The key assumption is that stockholders delegate 
day-to-day control of the company to managers, and so they cannot observe managerial 
decision making themselves. In a discussion of bank risk taking as a function of ownership 
structure Saunders et al. (1990) argue that a bank controlled by limited liability stockholders 
will take higher risks by increasing leverage. The ability to do so requires cooperation from 
management and a deregulated financial environment. In the name of equity maximization, 
diligence and efficiency may well be mutually exclusive virtues. Managers’ and shareholders 
incentives caused a, possibly, too easy access to credit, as well as increased leverage both for 
banks and for borrowers in the booms preceding the Norwegian banking crisis and the financial 
crisis, as diligent monitoring and responsible investments gave way to competition for market 
shares and demand for a high return on investment. Since the industry average return on 
investment works as a benchmark for performance, there was an upward pressure on managers 
to finance risky projects with a high return in the build up to both crises. As long as the 
economy was doing well, the expectation of continued future growth had the immediate result 
of a high return on investment. The high risk of these loans defaulting was postponed until the 
economy slowed down. Thus, the strategy which yielded a high return during the economic 
boom also deepened the recession as the risky loans went bad and interbank- as well as bank 
credit to private enterprise dried up.    
A major part of, otherwise uninvolved, external shareholders will have the opportunity 
to rid themselves of their stocks quite quickly in case their price is expected to decrease. This is 
particularly the case if the bank’s stock is frequently traded on the open stock market and there 
are many relatively small shareholders at any given time. Given the opportunity to terminate 
their position without having to endure large losses, a significant part of shareholders would 
benefit from hiring the bank manager most capable of boosting short-term earnings, possibly at 
the expense of long-term stability. If the manager is involved in the same incentive scheme 
either through the ownership of stock options or being subject to performance related payoff, 
his preferences for risk and return will align with those of the external stockholders. Although, 
this is not a desirable strategy from the point of view of bank depositors and customers, 
interested in a secure long-term relationship with the bank, the ownership structure may hence 
induce risk seeking behavior from managers, if shareholders with limited liability and an 
appetite for risk represent an important influence, through providing a significant part of the 
banks funding. It is important to recognize that a failure to meet shareholders’ demand for a 
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high return, may not only pressure for replacement of management, but also reduce the banks 
funding through reduced stock prices, as the sale volume increases.  
Bank managers are of course well aware of the different trade-offs they face, when 
deciding on an investment strategy and the level of market exposition. Where the sudden 
deregulation of Norwegian financial markets in the 1980s may have caused banks to make 
uninformed decisions due to inexperience, this is hardly the case after over two decades of 
competition. Still, there seems to be obvious signs of history repeating itself without proper 
regulation. This is not because bank managers fail to learn from their mistakes, but because 
they are exposed to a destabilizing incentive structure promoting risk seeking behavior.    
Another issue that can fuel risk seeking incentives is that some banking institutions are 
considered “too big to fail” by the government. A large bank is likely to be highly 
interconnected, so that its failure will have dire ramifications for the industry as a whole. This 
is a type of economic externality. Due to the high social cost of failure the probability of a 
bailout increases. Such a safety net forms a basis for moral hazard (Brunnermeier et al. 2009). 
The bank can gamble for resurrection by increasing its asset risks, boosting profits during a 
boom, while exposing the taxpayers to potential future losses. The government cannot credibly 
commit to allowing a “too big to fail” bank to go out of business if the externalities associated 
with the bankruptcy are large enough.   
Despite this theoretical insight, the Norwegian banking system proved to be more 
robust during the recent financial crisis, than in the Norwegian banking crisis. The banks were 
exposed to relatively less asset risk and overextension was a smaller problem. Interventions by 
the central bank and the government were largely concerned with improving liquidity. Defaults 
are not necessary to generate contagion. A drop in asset prices can be enough. Funding 
liquidity describes how easily a bank can obtain financing in the credit market and this will 
naturally drop as asset prices fall, since investors perceive the banks to become more risky 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009). Funding illiquidity is however not a result of insolvency or moral 
hazard and the government rightfully intervened to alleviate the credit crunch.    
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8 Conclusion 
 
The model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) explains in an intuitive way the need for indirect 
finance to supplement direct investment in a credit market with asymmetric information and 
moral hazard. A reduction in bank credit during crisis affects the composition of firms in the 
market by squeezing out small, opaque and poorly capitalized firms. The model however 
doesn’t explore the importance of intermediary capitalization, although it does assume 
intermediaries to be capital constrained. Poorly capitalized financial intermediaries are more 
likely to experience solvency problems during a recession with falling asset prices. Falling 
asset prices cause liquidity problems that in turn can force a fire sale. A fire sale can lower 
asset prices even further causing a downward spiral (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). For banks with 
only a small capital buffer, falling asset prices can result in solvency problems and if poor 
capitalization is prevalent throughout the banking industry, then the whole system can quickly 
become adversely affected once under stress. 
 A bank failure can have more unfortunate consequences for the economy than those 
originating from the failure of other institutions of similar size going out of business. This is 
due to large externalities related to a bank failure. The clients of a failed bank, including other 
banks are temporarily cut off from an important credit source and solvency problems can thus 
spread. Since banks are connected to each other through credit-line arrangements in the 
interbank market, a major bank failure increases the chances of a systemic crisis. Brunnermeier 
et al. (2009) write that the opposite is true when for example a production company goes 
bankrupt. In that case, its remaining competitors will be better off, because of a larger demand 
for their products. The fact that banks are vulnerable to falling asset prices and the potentially 
large externalities associated with a bank failure clearly speak in favor of financial regulation 
that can render the system more robust to fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Banks can profit on investing in smaller, more opaque projects than uninformed 
investors are comfortable with, and so it seems that the feature that created a need for financial 
intermediaries in the credit market in the first place, makes them more exposed to systematic 
risk during a recession. Prior to both crises, the lending standards of banks slipped as the desire 
to boost revenues came at the expense of diligent monitoring and screening, although in the 
case of Norwegian banks, these problems proved much more severe during the crisis of 1988-
1993 than during the recent financial crisis.  
Banks have the technology to monitor investments, which grants them access to a share 
of the lending market that normal investors find too risky. This however, does not guarantee 
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that a sufficient effort will be put into monitoring at all times. A good example would be the 
channeling of credit to the, in retrospect, clearly unsound subprime mortgage market by 
American banks prior to the financial crisis. Monitoring costs money and resources and 
investing heavily in it may thus seem like a wasteful practice to a profit maximizing manager 
during an economic boom when default rates are low. With this in mind, there might be a need 
for a stricter and less flexible industry standard to ensure a more precise and consistent 
mapping of true asset risks. Like I mentioned earlier, Basel III is taking a step in the right 
direction in this respect, by imposing banks to treat asset risks as if the economy were growing 
at an average pace during booms. This would prevent the riding of bubbles that was seen prior 
to both crises. Although Norwegian banks exerted more prudence than their US counterparts 
by refraining both from investing in subprime products and from using securitization to remove 
asset risk prior to the financial crisis, they still increased their lending significantly to profit on 
a flourishing domestic property market. The regulatory development suggests that there may 
exist an equilibrium level of capital requirements which will lead banks to choose a low-risk 
and stable investment strategy. In addition to enforcing a certain level of equity capital, there 
also needs to be restrictions on what can be counted as such in terms of quality, as well as an 
efficient system for risk weighing assets to provide the right incentives to the banking industry.     
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) point to important differences between individual risk and 
systemic risk. Even if individual financial institutions face low risk, the system as a whole may 
become increasingly exposed to risk, which was the case prior to the financial crisis. By 
lending to each other strategically, banks can reduce their individual risk, but the risk is not 
necessarily removed from the system itself and since banks and other financial institutions lend 
to each other on a major scale, the industry becomes very interconnected and exposed to 
contagion in a recession when risks become more systematic (i.e. real estate prices).  
Despite the benefits of a prudent lending strategy in the banking industry, future 
regulation still needs to allow banks to invest efficiently, to ensure that credit also reaches 
those opaque, yet profitable investment opportunities that individual investors fail to provide 
with funding in a credit market with asymmetric information. An alternative to the use of credit 
rationing as a means of achieving robustness may stem from the banks’ ability to efficiently 
monitor investments and gather valuable information about their borrowers. If banks put a 
larger effort into screening and monitoring, then some of the riskier investments could be 
avoided. To ensure that diligent monitoring becomes common practice, bank operations need 
to be transparent, enabling investors, regulators and rating agencies to effectively assess 
intermediary investment activities.    
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The model by Holmström and Tirole (1997) shows how poorly capitalized firms that borrow, 
require monitoring. Otherwise, limited liability can cause them to act irresponsibly. It fails 
however to apply the same line of reasoning to financial intermediaries with little equity 
capital. When a bank gears up its balance sheet using securitization or becomes overextended 
in some other way, to the degree that it might be the source of serious liquidity problems later, 
outside investors should be able to discipline their bank by providing less capital. The ability to 
administer such punishment efficiently requires detailed information about the bank’s financial 
situation and asset portfolio and so on. Such information is best gathered by an independent 
and unbiased regulatory agency, which should monitor the bank’s activities more intensively 
than what has been done in the past and then make the acquired information readily available 
to investors. It is possible that a credible threat of market discipline could counter the 
destabilizing incentives that deepened liquidity problems in the banking industry during both 
crises. Vale (2004) notes that inadequate supervision and regulation of the banking system, in 
particular when the economy is growing at an above average rate, can lead to a pro-cyclical 
lending pattern and excessive risk-taking by banks. By increasing the transparency of bank 
operations and level of market discipline, the banking industry will hopefully move into a self-
enforcing, good equilibrium where no bank will find excessive risk taking and lax monitoring 
routines profitable. A lack of market intervention can cause serious problems for over-
leveraged banks when, or if, the boom turns into a bust. Booms allow bubbles to build up and 
all capital invested in them will be quickly eroded once they burst. To passively allow banks to 
gear up these investments through lax regulation only exacerbates the problem.    
The Norwegian government stepped in to rescue important banks from failing during 
both recent crises, although solvency problems were only present during the Norwegian 
banking crisis. It is possible to imagine that the system could have been designed in such a 
way, so that no single bank was too large to fail. A tradition for government bailouts may 
initiate unfortunate rent seeking behavior by banks and further fuel the risk seeking behavior of 
banks with limited liability due to little equity capital. Mergers and acquisitions also often 
come into play when a bank is struggling against insolvency, causing banks to become even 
bigger in the wake of a crisis. This happened for example after the Norwegian banking crisis, 
when Nordea took over Kredittkassen.  
The reward structure of the banking industry has made risk seeking behavior desirable 
to managers. It is better for a manager to emulate the profitable yet risky strategy of his 
competitors and eventually fail than to go against the stream and succeed in the long-run. 
Subprime lending by US banks and aggressive, uninformed competition for market shares in 
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new locations, as was the case prior to the Norwegian banking crisis are just two examples of 
unfortunate, yet at the time accepted, practices. I illustrated how the outside option for 
investors affects the riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio, and that outside pressure for a high 
rate of return can contribute to the adoption of a short-term profit maximization strategy by 
bank managers.    
Banks need to collect outside financing from outside investors, less capable of 
monitoring, to lend efficiently. If these investors lending to banks demand a high rate of return, 
it can put pressure on a competitive banking industry to take more risks, as well as to move 
towards a higher share of short-term financing, being cheaper than long-term financing, but 
more likely to increase problems stemming from maturity-mismatch during recession.  
Securitization has allowed banks to increase their leverage and at the same time, pass 
much of the asset risk itself on to a third party. While securitization improves asset liquidity, it 
also encourages a bank to increase the share of its portfolio dedicated to risky assets, to boost 
the return on investments. If these assets perform poorly ex-post, the banks’ performance is 
more adversely affected, than it would be in an environment that discourages risky asset 
holding, according to Santomero and Trester (1998). This is exactly what happened to several 
large US banks during the financial crisis. Whether the prices of collateralized debt obligations 
held by American banks reflected their true market value has been the source of much 
speculation and mistrust in the US during the financial crisis. If a bank has private information 
about its assets, it might misuse its position when selling them to outsiders. Especially during 
favorable market conditions when the true risk of an asset is not instantly revealed. There are 
important distinctions between asset backed securities like CDO’s and OMF. Mainly the fact 
that the issuance of OMF are subject to strict regulation, while the special purpose vehicles 
trading CDO’s on behalf of banks existed in an unregulated loophole within the Basel 
regulation in place. Securitization made individual banks and other financial institutions seem 
safer, since they no longer were directly exposed to losses or defaults in their own asset 
portfolios. However, when accounting not only for risks faced by an individual bank, but also 
for the riskiness of the whole financial system, it becomes evident how securitization 
contributed to the problems of the recent financial crisis. The process of securitization does not 
remove the risks of the underlying assets, but rather distributes them around to those most 
willing to hold them. These buying institutions can be important investors and insurers in the 
financial market. Since the financial system is highly interconnected, falling asset prices will 
therefore still have a serious impact even if these assets are removed from the originator of the 
securities based on them. A weakly regulated form of securitization therefore seems 
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unadvisable in light of recent events. Even if using securitization as a means to remove asset 
risk from an individual institution is undesirable, the process still has the benefit of providing 
financial intermediaries with a new source of outside financing. This is also the case with 
regulated covered bonds like OMF. Issuing OMF seems a more responsible practice, since it 
does not remove risk. It still allows for leveraging by providing the banking industry with a 
relatively cheap financing option. This can be a good thing since issuing OMF can reduce the 
pressure on asset returns as well as reduce the dependence on short-term financing, hence 
alleviating the problems associated with maturity-mismatch during a recession. The Norwegian 
government’s program for swapping OMF for government bonds during the financial crisis 
proved, that as long as the quality of OMF are regulated, injecting liquidity into the system in 
this way is both effective and does not hurt the taxpayers. A conceivable downside is that such 
an alternative financing option can make the leveraging of banks’ balance sheets easier during 
booms, when the risks of the assets upon which the regulated OMF are based are low, 
potentially leading to overextension.     
Knowing that the government is willing to rescue important banks in a liquidity crisis 
can create some unfortunate incentives with respect to risk taking during periods of prolonged 
economic growth. Banks know that the depositors and the regulator, representing the 
taxpayers, face most of the downside risk in the event of a failure, while shareholders as well 
as managers can enjoy a high although risky return as long as the economy is growing at a 
healthy pace. This relates to the bailout problem, where limited liability for the agent deciding 
on the desired level of risk causes irresponsible behavior. It is better for an investor to satisfy 
shareholders with a high return today and look good in comparison to his peers, with the 
possibility of incurring a large loss later, than to be prudent and deliver a relatively small but 
safe return. This is especially true if his bank is considered too large to fail by the government 
and will be rescued in the event of insolvency.  
Norwegian banks have come a long way in terms of robustness, responsible investment 
and operating in a competitive market system since the Norwegian banking crisis. Liquidity 
problems during the recent crisis originated from international financial markets. Norwegian 
banks and regulators will possibly have to prepare to a larger extent for similar shocks coming 
from abroad in future. At present, there is a worry that stressed European governments like 
those of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland may default on their debt. This is a worst case 
scenario which has not been incorporated into the stress testing of banks in the wake of the 
financial crisis, and that can possibly have an adverse effect on those European banks that have 
given loans to these governments. 
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Appendix: A short introduction to banks, concepts and securities 
To clarify some of the topics to be discussed in this thesis, I feel that it is necessary to provide 
a brief and factual insight into bank operations and financial securities. Where not mentioned 
otherwise, the source is Norges Bank. To begin with, table A1 is a generic example of a banks 
balance sheet. 
Table A1 
A simplified balance sheet for a bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash Deposits 
Securities Short-term borrowing 
Loans Long-term debt 
Other assets Shareholders equity 
Total assets (100%) Total liabilities and equity (100%) 
 
Assets: These are the bank’s investments. Commercial banks typically hold a larger proportion 
of loans than securities and Norwegian banks are conservative in their choice of securities.  
Asymmetric information and adverse selection: Asymmetric information simply means that 
one party to a business arrangement has superior, relevant information ex-ante. For example a 
loan applicant knows that he intends to quit his job after obtaining a mortgage, but avoids 
telling his bank. Adverse selection can, among other things, mean that a certain business 
contract attracts customers of an inferior quality. For example an increasingly expensive car 
insurance policy, is ceteris paribus likely to attract an increasing share of irresponsible drivers. 
Capital requirements: These are bank regulations that attempt to control a bank’s capital 
ratio, which is defined as the percentage of capital to risk-weighted assets. Capital 
requirements can be both quantitative and qualitative. The quality of capital is positively 
related to how easily it can be written down to compensate for reduced asset prices. 
Capital squeeze: If there is a reduction in market demand, the profits of some firms become 
smaller or even turn negative. This development can in turn erode their own capital, increasing 
their share of debt financing. Hence, such a capital squeeze weakens their position in the credit 
market and might in the worst case deprive them of access to outside financing altogether, if 
banks and investors perceive these firms to have become too leveraged and risky. 
Credit crunch: A credit crunch occurs when the amount of available credit in the market is 
reduced. If investors and credit institutions are faced with growing market risks, they are likely 
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to provide less credit to firms, consumers and investment projects. When the default risks of 
borrowing firms increase both investors and banks are forced to compensate by reining in on 
their lending and charging higher risk premiums through interest rates. Banks that are 
overextended can quickly become illiquid once the market situation deteriorates and asset 
prices fall. Their reduced liquidity makes them reluctant to issue new loans, and like other 
businesses, banks can experience difficulties gathering new financing in the market to keep up 
their lending activity. A recession is assumed to negatively affect both the availability of credit 
and the debt/equity ratio of firms’ balance sheets, i.e. a simultaneous credit crunch and capital 
squeeze.  
Credit rating:  Financial institutions, securities and even countries are rated according to their 
perceived ability to repay a loan. Credit ratings are usually given by an independent rating 
agency like Moody’s Investors Service or Standard & Poor’s and their assessments send 
helpful signals to investors about the safety and quality of various investment opportunities. 
Banks and corporations as well as financial securities are rated on a scale from AAA to D. A 
security with a BBB- rating or lower is considered a junk bond, meaning that only those with a 
high appetite for risk should buy it. In Norway, banks are rated by DnB NOR Markets, which 
is an independent branch of Norway’s largest bank.       
Debt ranking: Senior debt surpasses junior debt in the queue for repayment when a company 
is liquidated. Subordinated debt would be an example of junior debt. The same system applies 
to claims against financial securities that are divided into senior/ junior tranches.   
Fire sale: A fire sale refers to the premature liquidation of assets, usually at a low price. This is 
done to improve liquidity. 
Gearing and leveraging: Gearing, or leveraging are terms for multiplying gains or losses. If 
an investment is financed by ½ cash equity and ½ outside debt, then the leverage is 2 to 1. To 
put it simply, this means that the investment is worth twice of what the investor originally 
could afford. This ratio is the accounting leverage. At the same time, the volatility of this 
investment is twice that of an unleveraged investment, i.e. an investment financed entirely by 
equity. Since the investor only actually owns half of his investment, his entire position will be 
lost should its value fall by 50 percent. Similarly, an investment with leverage of 4 to 1 will be 
lost after a 25 percent drop in value. The increase in volatility due to debt financing is the 
economic leverage. When referring to gearing or leveraging of the balance sheets of banks, I 
mean the amplification of assets and liabilities relative to equity. The intuition however, is the 
same as in the example described above.  The gearing of balance sheets also increase market 
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exposure and volatility, making banking more profitable, but more risky as well. Some 
individual risks can be removed through diversification, but generally the argument holds.  
Haircut: This determines how leveraged a bank can be. If a haircut is 2 percent, then a bank 
can borrow $ 98 for $ 100 worth of securities used as collateral. The bank will have to 
contribute the remaining $ 2 from its equity A recession will increase the haircut. In this 
example an increase to $ 4, means that the bank must liquidate 50 percent of its assets or come 
up with new equity. The more leveraged a bank is, the more severe are the consequences of an 
increased haircut (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). 
Idiosyncratic and systematic risk: Idiosyncratic risks can be diversified away in a well 
designed investment portfolio, by holding assets which prices are uncorrelated. The market 
price of copper does not affect the market price of cardboard. Systematic risks cannot be 
diversified away and are tied to the economic growth of the market that is being invested in, for 
example commercial property (Lintner, 1965).  
Inside lag and outside lag of regulation: The inside lag refers to the time it takes for the 
government or a central bank to decide on a proper response, after it has become aware of an 
economic problem. An example would be the time it takes for a central bank, in a floating 
exchange rate regime, to change the interest rate after some news about the economy has 
become available. The inside lag of financial policy and legislation is typically longer than that 
of monetary policy, and is therefore relatively less efficient at counteracting sudden economic 
changes. The outside lag is the time span between the implementation of a response and when 
it takes full effect on the economy. The outside lag is typically longer for monetary policy, and 
Norges bank estimates that a change in its interest rate takes full effect after one to three years. 
However, if the market anticipates that the central bank is going to lower its interest rate to 
fight recession, there is an immediate, positive effect. And countercyclical monetary policy is 
thus made possible (Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005). 
Liabilities: These constitute the bank’s funding. When, for example, the value of the bank’s 
assets (loans and securities) drop, there needs to be a similar reduction on the liabilities side, 
i.e. some of the liabilities have to be written down. Shareholder’s equity is the easiest to write 
down to compensate for reduced asset value. Fundamentally, equity is the margin by which 
creditors will be covered if a bank’s assets were liquidated. When this margin is diminished, 
the cost of a bank’s borrowing increases, because investors grow skeptical.  
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Liquidity problems: Such problems arise because of the asset-liability maturity mismatch. As 
long as a bank’s assets pay off as planned, liquidity is sound regardless of leverage. Funding 
problems occur when it is prohibitively expensive to sell off assets to reduce exposure and to 
obtain additional funding, referred to as low market liquidity and low funding liquidity 
respectively (Brunnermeier et al, 2009). Large deposit withdrawals or difficulties with 
renewing funding can force banks to sell assets prematurely.  
Liquidator: A liquidator is the officer appointed when a company is liquidated. He is 
responsible for collecting all of the company’s assets and for settling all claims against the 
company before it is broken up. In compulsory liquidation, the liquidator must assume control 
of all property to which the company appears to be entitled. The actions of the liquidator are 
supervised by a court of law. 
Maturity mismatch: During the recent financial crisis, several banks experienced severe 
difficulties because they had a relatively large share of short-term debt. This was a much larger 
problem in the United States than in Norway. Short-term debt is a cheaper source of finance 
than long-term debt and is profitable when the market is in good shape, but it makes banks 
dependent on being able to refinance. Lending long and borrowing short is an important source 
of stress in the banking industry. 
Reserve requirements: These are reserves that a bank must hold against deposits, which need 
to be very liquid. Cash kept in the central bank, or safe and liquid assets are good examples. 
When depositor demand for withdrawals increases, a bank can draw on its reserves and can 
thus avoid liquidating less liquid assets prematurely.   
Solvency: If equity capital is exhausted, the value of a bank’s liabilities become greater than 
the total value of its assets and it is then insolvent.  
Systemic banking crisis: A systemic banking crisis occurs when the whole banking system is 
suffering from liquidity problems. Since the majority of a bank's assets are tied up in relatively 
long-term investments, banks are dependent on lending to each other in the interbank market at 
any given time to complete daily transactions. If a major bank in the system becomes illiquid, 
the problem might spread. This is also known as contagion and how easily the problems of one 
bank can affect other banks, depends among other things, on the structuring of credit lines in 
the banking system. Contagion can also refer to the spreading of financial problems in one 
country to others. For an analysis of systemic banking crisis and contagion, see Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998).   
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In Norway there are only a small number of major banks, and Norges Bank is working on 
models for credit line arrangements that will make the banking system as robust as possible, 
against the prospect of illiquidity becoming contagious, in turn causing a systemic crisis. If a 
bank has more credit lines it will be able to withstand stress for a longer time, but if it should 
still fail, more banks will be affected in its wake. This is an important trade off for a financial 
regulator to consider. It should also be mentioned that the central bank can step in as a lender 
of last resort to rescue an individual bank from illiquidity, but preferably not insolvency. This 
is a problem however, since the distinction is often hard to make for an outside party. Besides, 
banks are usually reluctant to seek central bank aid since it sends a signal to the public that the 
bank is unable to attain credit in the interbank or stock market, and this signal may in turn 
trigger speculation about the banks solvency (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
P a g e  | 69 
 
References 
 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (1999) “Bubbles, Crises and Policy” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 15 No. 3, 9-18. 
Bakke, B. and Rakkestad (2010) ”Obligasjoner med fortrinnsrett – et marked i sterk vekst” 
Penger og Kreditt 38 No. 1, 4-19. 
Bernanke, B. et al. (1996) “The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality”Review of 
Economics and Statistics 78 No. 1, 1-15. 
Bhattacharya, S. and Thakor, A.V. (1993) “Contemporary Banking Theory” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 3 No. 1, 2-50. 
Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009) “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 23 No. 1, 77-100.  
Brunnermeier, M.K. et al. (2009) ”The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” 
Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. 
Boot, A.W.A. (1999) “Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9 No. 1, 7-25.  
Byrd, J. et al. (1998) “Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value” Financial Analyst 
Journal 54 No. 3, 14-30. 
Demiralp, S. et al. (2005) “Overnight Interbank Loan Markets” Journal of Economics and 
Business 58 No. 1, 67-83.  
Demyanyk, Y. and Hemert, O.V. (2009) “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” 
Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies, 1-33. 
Diamond, D.W. (1991) “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and 
Directly” The Journal of Political Economy 99 No. 4, 689-721. 
Diamond, D.W. (1996) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring: A Simple 
Example” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 51 No.3, 51-66. 
P a g e  70 | 
 
Diamond, D.W. and Rajan, R.G. (2009) “The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and 
Remedies” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 99 No. 2, 606-610. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (1998) “The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developing and Developed Countries” Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 45 No. 1, 
81-109. 
Finanstilsynet (2006) ”Rapport for finansinstitusjoner 2006” (26. februar 2006).  
Finanstilsynet (2009) ”Foredrag av avdelingsdirektør Emil Steffensen i Risk Forum” (26. 
august 2009). 
Freixas X. and Rochet J.C. (1997) “Microeconomics of Banking” The MIT Press. 
Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1997) ”Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real 
Sector” The Quarterly Journal Of Economics 112 No. 3, 663-691. 
Hyun, S.S. (2009) “Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global 
Financial Crisis” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, No. 1, 101–119. 
IMF (2008) “Global Financial Stability Report – Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring 
Financial Soundness” World Economic Financial Surveys, April 2008. 
IMF (2009) “Global Financial Stability Report – Responding to the Financial Crisis and 
Measuring Systemic Risks” World Economic Financial Surveys, April 2009.  
Kashyap, A.K. and Stein, J.C. (1994) “Monetary Policy and Bank Lending” In Mankiw, N.G. 
ed., Monetary Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for NBER, 1994, 221-256. 
Lintner, J. (1965) “Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification” Journal of 
Finance 20 No. 4, 587-615.   
Moe, T.G. (2004) “Extract from Report No. 17 (1997-1998) to the Storting on the Norwegian 
Banking Crisis” T.G. Moe, J.A. Solheim and B. Vale (ed): The Norwegian Banking Crisis, 
Norges Bank Occasional Papers No. 33, 209-223. 
Nilssen, T. (1995) ”Hvordan skaffe kapital til næringslivet? Bank kontra aksjemarked” Norsk 
Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 27-50.  
P a g e  | 71 
 
Norges Bank (2007) ”Finansiell stabilitet” Norges Bank rapportserie, No.5. 
Norges Bank (2008) ”Finansiell stabilitet” Norges Bank rapportserie, No.5. 
Norges Bank (2009) ”Finansiell stabilitet” Norges Bank rapportserie, No.1. 
Rakkestad, K.J. and Weme, S. (2006) ”CDO-er: Nye muligheter for å investere i 
kredittmarkedet” Penger og Kreditt 34 No. 2, 116-128. 
Santomero A.M. and Trester J.J. (1998) “Financial Innovation and Bank Risk Taking” Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization 35 No. 1, 25-37. 
Saunders, A. et al. (1990) “Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking” Journal 
of Finance 45 No. 2, 643-654. 
Steigum, E. (2004) “Financial deregulation with a fixed exchange rate: Lessons from Norway’s 
boom-bust cycle and banking crisis” T.G. Moe, J.A. Solheim and B. Vale (ed): The Norwegian 
Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Papers No. 33, 23-75. 
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. (1981) “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information” 
American Economic Review 71 No. 3, 393-410. 
Sørensen P.B. and Whitta-Jacobsen H.J. (2005) “Introducing Advanced Macroeconomics: 
Growth and Business Cycles” McGraw-Hill Education. 
Tirole, J. (2006) ”The Theory of Corporate Finance” Princeton University Press. 
Vale, B. (2004) “The Norwegian Banking Crisis” in T.G. Moe, J.A. Solheim and B. Vale (ed): 
The Norwegian Banking Crisis, Norges Bank Occasional Papers No. 33, 1-21. 
 
Web Articles: 
Gapper, John (15.11.2007) ”Wall Street’s bruising musical chairs” Gapper Blog Financial 
Times. Available at: http://blogs.ft.com/gapperblog/2007/11/wall-streets-brhtml/ 
IMF webpage factsheet (30.9.2010) “A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs” IMF. 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G10   
Landler, Mark (21.4.2009) “I.M.F. Puts Bank Losses From Global Financial Crisis at $4.1 
Trillion” The New York Times. Available at: 
P a g e  72 | 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/business/global/22fund.html 
Pittman, Mark (28.3.2007) ”Subprime Mortgage Bonds From 2006 May Be Worst Ever” 
Bloomberg. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aEtwcRJfM01Y&refer=us 
Terra website: 
http://www.terra.no/omterra/historie/Sider/Forside.aspx  
Werdigier, Julia (28.11.2007) “As towns go broke, subprime crisis hits Arctic Circle” The New 
York times. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-
bank.4.8517748.html?_r=1 
Øystein Sjølie (27.11.2007) “Dette er Terra-skandalen” Hegnar Online. Available at: 
http://e24.no/boers-og-finans/article2122946.ece  
 
